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Abstract
This thesis addresses secure conﬁguration of reconﬁgurable radio systems such as
software deﬁned radio. Software deﬁned radio (SDR) supports integration and co-
existence of multiple radio access technologies on a general-purpose radio equipment.
Its reconﬁgurable radio capabilities make it an ideal solution for interoperability
among heterogeneous wireless communications systems, especially in public safety do-
main. Because an SDR device is able to switch its operating mode by conﬁguring its
baseband software and change its radio parameters such as frequency, output power,
and modulation format, it is challenging to ensure that radiated emissions of the
radio conform with FCC regulations, and hinders widespread adoption of this tech-
nology. For SDR systems to realize their full potential, they must be reconﬁgurable
through automated deployment of SDR components. As the industry is moving to-
ward open architectures, portability and conﬁgurability of third party software must
be provided. We present a conﬁguration framework that automates conﬁguration of
an SDR terminal using third party software components, validates conformance of
radio conﬁguration, and attests the conﬁguration to a service provider.
For automated conﬁguration, we developed a hierarchical two-phase methodology
that supports portable conﬁguration proﬁles and plug-n-play radio composition. We
use a graph mapping model to convert conﬁguration proﬁle into a deployable ﬂowraph
of waveform components. We show how capabilities and regulations can be reﬂected
in conﬁguration proﬁles, and how these proﬁles can be ported using XML templates.
ii
For conﬁguration validation, we present a model for component-based certiﬁcation of
an SDR terminal. Methodologies for verifying certiﬁcation of downloaded software,
checking consistency of conﬁguration, and securing the download channel are used
to provide conformance validation for SDR terminal. For conﬁguration attestation,
we use trusted computing services to support a trusted conﬁguration platform. We
outline a secure boot sequence that allow an SDR terminal to ascertain its current
conﬁguration to a remote party in a robust manner.
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The world of wireless is rapidly evolving as new technologies such as Wi-Fi, WiMAX
and OFDM join already deployed wireless solutions such as 2.5G and 3G. This pro-
liferation of wireless technologies means that devices in the future will be required
not only to support multiple air interfaces but also be capable of working in multiple
frequency bands. Implementing these multiple functionalities in hardware would be
expensive and extremely diﬃcult, hence the drive towards Software Deﬁned Radio
(SDR).
Software deﬁned radio technology implements radio wave functionalities such as mod-
ulation, ampliﬁcation, phasing, mixing, and up/down-converting as software modules
running on a generic hardware platform. Traditional radios are built for a particular
frequency range, modulation type and output power. In SDR, these radio frequency
(RF) parameters can be conﬁgured when the radio device is in use rather than when it
is manufactured. This enables highly ﬂexible handheld devices that can switch from
one network technology to another to suit a particular application or environment.
Furthermore, the software that implement various radio technologies and services can
be downloaded over-the-air onto the handsets.
Interoperability across heterogeneous radio networks supported by SDR is crucial in
public safety. In emergency situations, public safety agencies such as police, ﬁre de-
partments, and emergency medical services need to be able to communicate with one
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another and share information. A 2004 U.S. Conference of Mayors Interoperability
Survey [1] found that in 77% of the 192 cities surveyed, police and ﬁre departments
could not talk to one another, and in 66% of them, all three agencies were not inter-
operable. Communication has been ﬁngered repeatedly as the single largest barrier
to emergency response after Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast. A similar
problem existed earlier in the aftermath of the 9/11.
SDR based equipment may be conﬁgured to practically any setting and may po-
tentially implement any radio interface, a radio access standard or even a rogue
scheme. The reconﬁgurability capability opens way for any type of intended as well
as unintended incorrect system implementation. In particular SDR technology based
terminals can be easily circulated and may be put into use in administrative areas
where regulation or law prohibits the use of a reconﬁguration capability. There also
will be the problem of how to prevent unintentional and intentional conﬁgurations
causing interfering emissions and the unintentional incrimination of users arises.
As we see, SDR technology has numerous technical challenges that need to be resolved
before it can be successfully deployed. General SDR challenges are the provision of:
advanced spectrum management for dynamic allocation of spectrum according to
traﬃc needs, robust security measures for secure conﬁguration of terminals, secure
software download, and to prevent misuse of the system, open software architecture
with well deﬁned interfaces.
In this work, we investigate secure and automated conﬁguration for SDR. Several
previous works researched SDR conﬁguration issues [2, 3, 4, 5]. However, they as-
sume that software modules composing a radio conﬁguration is supplied only by the
manufacturer and its conﬁguration is pre-deﬁned by the vendor or hardware manu-
facturer. None of them addresses security implications of a highly conﬁgurable radio
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with portable conﬁguration speciﬁcations and reusable third party components. To
the best of our knowledge, the problem of composing a valid radio given third party
components has not been extensibly addressed.
We need to understand the dimensions and objectives of our system security. Chapter
4 we deﬁne the threat model we used to identify and describe security threats. Then
we present example of threat scenarios that pertain to an SDR terminal. Finally we
identify security requirements for SDR conﬁguration.
To facilitate a plug-n-play component composition and make the conﬁguration spec-
iﬁcation portable, we propose an automated conﬁguration methodology for SDR in
Chapter 5. The core of the methodology is a conﬁguration processor which com-
poses DSP components according to a conﬁguration speciﬁcation of the desired radio
mode. We give a schematic view of the conﬁguration process along with an example
scenario, and model such notions as component, conﬁguration, mapping of a conﬁg-
uration proﬁle into a deployable ﬂowgraph.
We consider certiﬁcation of reconﬁgurable devices such as SDR, and address this
issue within the conﬁguration framework in Chapter 6. FCC requires each SDR
hardware and software combination be tested for certiﬁcation. This severely limits
the widespread application of SDR equipment. We postulate that it is possible to
certify a component-based SDR terminal where the operating software, digital signal
processing (DSP) software components, and configuration description are decoupled.
We present a methodology for component-based certiﬁcation which assures SDR ter-
minal’s conformity based on a separate certiﬁcation of its architecture layer. We
outline the component-based certiﬁcation process, and present a secure download
protocol based on trusted computing functionality. We also discuss how to verify
regulatory conformance of downloaded software, and what pragmatic compatibility
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checks exist out there.
Remote attestation is a technique for ascertaining the operating state of a radio
platform to a remotely located party in a secure manner. The platform software that
manages and controls the device conﬁguration should be trusted, and be able to prove
its trustworthiness to the remote party. We use Trusted Computing concept to ensure
the integrity of radio platform in Chapter 7. We brieﬂy review trusted computing
concepts, then describe what speciﬁc TPM functionalities we use to provide a trusted




This chapter we present some background information related to this thesis. Soft-
ware deﬁned radio is a relatively new technology and its important to understand
the unique features of SDR compared to other wireless communications systems in
order to accurately asses its capabilities and challenges. In section 2.1 we brieﬂy
discuss SDR architecture and features. Then in Section 2.2 we give examples of SDR
applications in public safety and critical infrastructure domains. Finally we discuss
current hardware capabilities of SDR in Section 2.3.
2.1 SDR as Reconﬁgurable Radio
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted the following regulatory deﬁ-
nition for software deﬁned radio [6].
Software Defined Radio. A radio that includes a transmitter in which the
operating parameters of frequency range, modulation type or maximum
output power (either radiated or conducted) can be altered by making a
change in software without making any changes to hardware components
that aﬀect the radio frequency emissions.
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Figure 2.1 shows the block diagram of a generic digital radio transceiver consisting
of the radio frequency (RF) front-end, the intermediate frequency (IF) section and
the baseband section.
The RF front-end functions as the transmitter and receiver for the RF signal received
via the antenna. On the receive path, it down-converts the RF signal to IF signal for
further processing in the IF section. On the transmit path, it performs up-conversion
to convert the IF signal to RF signal followed by power ampliﬁcation.
The IF section is responsible for analog-to-digital conversion (ADC) and digital-to-
analog conversion (DAC) on the receive path and the transmit path, respectively.
The digital down converter (DDC) and digital up-converter (DUC) that proceeds and
precedes the ADC and DAC respectively, jointly assume the functions of a modem.
The baseband section performs baseband operations such as connection setup, equal-
ization, frequency hopping, timing recovery and correlation. In software deﬁned radio,
the baseband processing and the DDC and DUC modules (highlighted in the ﬁgure)
are designed to be software programmable [7]. The link layer protocols, modulation
and demodulation operations are implemented in software.
Figure 2.1: A generic digital radio transceiver.
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Reconﬁgurability provides essential mechanisms to terminals and network segments
to adapt dynamically, transparently and securely to the most appropriate radio ac-
cess technology. SDR presents many beneﬁts to various communications entities.
Equipment manufacturers can use a common design for multi-functional radios lead-
ing to increased market size for a single product. For operators, the interoperability
of diﬀerent networks is enhanced and system upgrades and bugs ﬁxing becomes eas-
ier to manage and implement. Consumers gain enhanced functionality of their radio
devices and the possibility to achieve ubiquitous connectivity. SDR enables the fast
introduction of new services into mobile networks without requiring the purchase of
new terminals.
SDR implements in software the LL/MAC layer components such as MAC protocols,
framer, encoder, and some parts of the physical layer such as modulation and demod-
ulation. Just few very time intensive functions are still implemented in hardware, for
example the sampling of signals and the synchronization between component parts.
This makes an SDR very ﬂexible and theoretically, it can morph into a cell phone
using GPRS, wireless communication system using IEEE 802.11, navigation system
using GPS, AM/FM or HDTV receiver.
2.2 SDR Applications
In this section we present applications of software deﬁned radio technology. Due to
its powerful reconﬁgurable capabilities, SDR is an ideal solution in public safety and
military domains where interoperability among heterogenuos wireless communications
systems is important. First we discuss how SDR can be used to extend GPS signal
reception indoors for ﬁrst responders. Then we discuss how power grids can deploy
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SDR as a long-term, inexpensive communications solution.
2.2.1 Extending GPS Signals Indoors
A networked radionavigation approach that augments GPS signals with time-of-
arrival observations using a software-deﬁned radio can overcome attenuation, and
often complete blockage, of GPS inside buildings or in urban canyons. The SDR can
operate both as a GPS receiver and also as a 900 MHz transceiver operating within
the ISM band. Applications for this technology include ﬁreﬁghters and other ﬁrst
responders, and military operations in urban terrain.
While GPS is the natural choice for providing navigation in an outdoors environment,
the urban environment places a signiﬁcant challenge for positioning using GPS. The
GPS signals can be signiﬁcantly attenuated, and often completely blocked, inside
buildings or in urban canyons. Personnel tracking inside buildings for improved com-
mand, control, and rescue rates high on the list of priority needs prepared by the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security for ﬁrst responders. Tracking ﬁreﬁghters will
allow for better tactical decisions and faster ﬁre suppression, resulting in decreased
property losses.
A company called NavSys developed an SDR that includes the capability to operate
both as a GPS receiver and as a 900 MHz transceiver operating within the indus-
trial, scientiﬁc, and medical (ISM) band. Since both the GPS and communications
functions reside within common radio hardware, this positioning and communica-
tions (POSCOMM) [8] device can use the two functionalities to provide a positioning
capability that leverages both the GPS-derived pseudorange and carrier-phase obser-
vations and the communications channel’s time-of-arrival (TOA) observations.
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Figure 2.2: POSCOMM time-of-arrival network.
The POSCOMM SDRs are designed to operate in a networked architecture, as shown
in Figure 2.2, where master units designated as transmitters provide TOA-augmented
navigation to slave units operating as receivers in a GPS-denied urban environment.
The master units transmit a TOA message that includes a pseudorandom sequence
from which the TOA at the slave unit can be precisely determined. A message is also
sent including the precise time of transmission of the TOA message and the precise
location of the master unit based on the GPS observations. The TOA diﬀerenced
with the time-of-transmission provides the slave unit with a pseudorange observation
from each of the master units’ locations. This can be used to solve for the position
of the slave either using the TOA updates alone or a combination of both the GPS
and TOA observations.
2.2.2 Communication for Critical Infrastructure
Critical infrastructures are systems whose failure or destruction would have a debili-
tating impact on the defense or economic security of the nation [9]. These systems
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include electrical power systems. The North American power grid involves nearly
3,500 utility organizations delivering electricity over more than 200,000 miles of trans-
mission lines to 300 million people. And yet this critical infrastructure is not able to
cope with grid-wide phenomena such as the 2003 Northeast Blackout that aﬀected 50
million people and caused ﬁnancial losses of up to $6 billion due to the power outage.
A major culprit is the inadequate communication infrastructure of the power grid.
The power grid’s existing communication architecture limits the deployment of con-
trol and protection schemes to manage electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution eﬀectively. Ideally, grid companies want ﬁne grain monitoring and con-
trol of their distribution network, even down to the last transformer. Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems have been used for years in the
power grid to monitor and control substations and ﬁeld instruments. However, there
are still many distribution substations that are not equipped with SCADA and re-
quire manual, human maintenance. During a recent ﬁeld trip to AmerenIP’s sites,
we found that out of their 550 substations in Illinois, only 200 were equipped with
SCADA systems.
A SCADA system gathers information (such as where high voltage has occurred)
from ﬁeld instruments, transfers the information back to the substation and control
center, alerts the control center of any alarms, carries out any necessary local analysis
and control such as determining if the voltage level has risen above or dropped below
a critical level, and allows the control center to modify control on the distribution
system. The importance of this system is that it can provide early warning of po-
tential disaster situations and provides safe, non-destructive operation of devices and
transmission lines. Unfortunately, many of those substations that require SCADA
would require installing necessary communication lines to the control center and to
ﬁeld instruments such as pole-top Remote Terminal Units (RTUs). The technology
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of ﬁeld instruments has evolved beyond simple RTUs, with increasing deployment
of Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) and synchronous Phaser Measurement Units
(PMUs) that give a much more detailed insight into grid dynamics and post-incident
analysis [10]. However, this data cannot easily be utilized beyond the substation
when the grid has limited communication lines.
There is also a need for point-to-point communication between substations to imple-
ment Special Protection Schemes (SPS). SPS address some of the wide-area control
issues where the occurrence of particular events or measurements at one point in the
grid triggers actions (such as a breaker tripping) at another. The existing approaches
to communication architecture do not link substations directly. In short, communi-
cation networks are needed to connect SCADA control centers with substations and
ﬁelds instruments, and to link substations with other substations. Such a network
can be very expensive to build and maintain.
Traditional solutions for implementing communication lines have been to lease lines
from telecom providers at very high installation and maintenance costs. Leased tele-
phone channels also provide limited reliability and sometimes may not be even avail-
able at the substation site. During our ﬁeld trip to AmerenIP, it was disclosed to us
that the local phone company will no longer give them dedicated copper lines for their
substations. The other diﬃcult aspect of installing physical communication lines is
that distribution networks cover very large geographic areas.
One might think that the Power Line Carrier (PLC) is a good solution for this
problem. PLC uses the power lines to transmit radio frequency signals in the range
of 30-500 kHz [11]. PLC is not subject to the unreliability of leased telephone
lines. However, power lines are a hostile environment for signal propagation, with
excessive noise levels and cable attenuation. Also PLC is not independent of the
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power distribution system, thus making it unsuitable for emergency situations when
the communication lines must operate even if the power lines are out of service.
Such diﬃcult networking problems can be solved with wireless radio technologies. In
general, wireless communication oﬀers lower installation and maintenance costs than
ﬁxed communication lines, and they provide more ﬂexibility in network conﬁgura-
tion. There are many diﬀerent types of wireless technologies such as satellites, very
high frequency radio, ultra high frequency radio, and microwave radio. Each has its
own advantages and disadvantages. The satellite system contains a number of radio
transponders which receive and retransmit frequencies to ground stations within its
coverage on the earth’s surface. Advantages of the satellite system are wide area
coverage, easy access to remote sites, and low error rates. Its disadvantages are
transmission time delay, and continual leasing costs incurred on time-of-use basis.
The Very High Frequency (VHF) radio operates in 30-300 MHz band and mostly
reserved for mobile services. On the other hand, Ultra High Frequency (UHF) sys-
tems operate in 300-3000 MHz band, and can be Point-To-Point (PTP), Point-To-
Multipoint (PTM), Trunked Mobile Radio (TPR), or spread spectrum systems. VHF
radios, PTP and PTM radios in UHF have advantages of propagating over non-line-
of-sight paths, low cost radios, and available frequency assignments. Their disad-
vantages are low channel capacity and low digital data bit rate. Spread spectrum
systems are the basis for many wireless applications including 802.11 networks, and
can operate with low power radios without licenses. However, these radios are subject
to interference from co-channel transmitters and have limited path lengths because
of restrictions on RF power output.
Microwave radio is a UHF radio operating at frequencies above 1 GHz. These systems
have high channel capacities and data rates. However, microwave radios require line
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of sight clearance, are more expensive to develop than VHF and UHF, and sometimes
the appropriate frequency assignments are not available in urban areas.
A SCADA radio device can be implemented using any of the above mentioned radio
technologies. Figure 2.3 illustrates how wireless communication could be deployed
in the power grid. Researchers have conducted experiments and evaluations of these
radios including 802.11, GPRS, and 900 MHz [12, 13, 14]. Each one has one or
more disadvantages, and the technology may become outdated in the long term. It
is no easy task to upgrade thousands of equipment in the power grid. It is costly
and time consuming. The existing power grid communication lines and equipment
are outdated for a reason- they have been installed decades ago.
Figure 2.3: Wireless communication in the power grid.
Thus, the ideal radio platform for the power grid should accommodate future wireless
communication needs, have low installation and maintenance costs, and be capable
of reconﬁguring and updating its operation and software. Such considerations favor
examining Software Deﬁned Radio (SDR) as a possible radio platform. SDR imple-
ments the functions of radio devices such as modulation, signal generation, coding
and link-layer protocols as software modules running on a generic hardware platform.
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Traditional radios are built for a particular frequency range, modulation type and
output power. In SDR, these radio frequency (RF) parameters can be conﬁgured
when the radio device is in use rather than when it is manufactured. This enables
highly ﬂexible radios that can switch from one communication technology to another
to suit a particular application or environment. Furthermore, the protocols that im-
plement various radio technologies and services can be downloaded over-the-air onto
the radio device.
Software radio is a suitable wireless media to replace legacy communication devices in
power grids. The reconﬁgurability of SDR supports the integration and co-existence
of multiple radio access technologies on a general-purpose radio equipment, enabling
implementation of powerful SCADA networks. At the same time, the wireless and
reconﬁgurable nature of SDR introduces potentially serious security problems such as
unauthorized access to the SCADA system, spooﬁng or suppression of utility alarms,
and conﬁguration of a malfunctioning or malicious radio equipment.
We investigate the security challenges of deploying software radios in the power grid
[15, 16]. To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been addressed before.
The security goals are to prevent installation and execution of unauthorized soft-
ware, ensure the device operates within allowed frequency bands and power levels,
and prevent the device from operating in a malicious manner. The main challenges
are how to dynamically and securely conﬁgure software components on the radio
that are possibly originating from diﬀerent vendors as the power industry is shifting
from proprietary protocols toward open and standard protocols, and how to attest
the validity of the radio conﬁguration to a master node. We presented these and
other security challenges in detail, and based on our analysis, we formulated security
requirements of a trusted conﬁguration framework for SDR in the power grid.
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2.3 Current SDR Hardware Capabilities
The purpose of this discussion is to illustrate the inherent hardware limitations, and
therefore, the intrinsic security, expected to be found in current and next generation
handsets. The notion of a Software Deﬁned Radio as a device capable of near limitless
ﬂexibility is not quite true in the current state of its hardware capabilities. This is the
reason why so far, only a limited number of academic, government, and commercial
eﬀorts are under way to address SDR issues. The technology itself quite remarkable
and provides many advantages. However, its hardware has not caught up with all
the possibilities of the technology, and hinders a widespread adoption of SDR. This
is particularly true for the commercial wireless handset market, where the public
demand for small, lightweight, low cost, battery eﬃcient products, is a paramount
consideration for equipment manufacturers.
Manufacturers have, and will continue to, design products that operate with very
speciﬁc and limited radio parameters (e.g. modulation, frequency, output power).
It is true that with the emergence of new communications systems (e.g. wireless
LAN) that the market will demand devices with increasing degrees of multi-band
and multi-mode functionality. This demand will drive equipment manufacturers to
seek out the most optimal implementation technologies (like SDR) to address the
product requirements. Even in these cases, however, the capabilities of these multi-
mode devices will be essentially limited to the speciﬁc set of wireless services that
were considered at the time of product design.
Advances in semiconductor technologies have enabled transmitter and receiver ar-
chitectures to have fewer Intermediate Frequency (IF) stages, and less signal pro-
cessing/ﬁltering achieved in hardware circuitry. Nevertheless, current and future
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generation equipment must still depend on electromechanical devices such as RF ﬁl-
ters and resonators. Demanding product size and cost constraints dictate that these
hardware elements be properly speciﬁed. Consequently, it might be unreasonable to
expect (current or future generation) handsets to have the inherent hardware ability
to operate signiﬁcantly outside of the frequency bands, in which, they were designed
to operate.
With the continuing trend toward sophisticated modulation protocols, it is increas-
ingly common for modem functionality to be implemented digitally. Advances in
microprocessor technologies will enable the trend toward software programmable
modulators and demodulators. Therefore, of the three RF parameters (frequency,
modulation, and output power), modulation will typically have the greatest degree of
SW ﬂexibility found in current and future generation radio architectures. However,
an improper change to only the modulation format has limited potential to produce
harmful consequences. This potential is primarily limited to Denial of Service (DoS)
scenarios, where individual units are rendered inoperative due to an improper change
in modulation format. Providing security against such scenarios, therefore, is impor-
tant and we included this threat in our threat model.
Much like frequency, output power is limited by inherent electrical and mechanical
limitations of the hardware design. Power ampliﬁer circuitry is optimally designed to
produce the rated maximum output power, with minimal headroom. What margin
does exist is the result of typical design and production tolerances. Of the three
RF parameter (frequency, modulation, and output power), output power is the least
likely to be impacted by the emergence of SDR technologies. Realistic security threats
involving output power are mostly conﬁned to scenarios whereby a handset operates
at its rated maximum, when it should be operating at a power reduced state. This






This chapter presents the problems addressed by this thesis and brieﬂy explains our
approach to solving them. First we state the general problem, then discuss individual
problems. Finally we state our thesis and the success criteria for this work.
3.1 Problem Statement
Interoperability across heterogeneous radio networks supported by SDR is crucial
in public safety. However, SDR technology has numerous technical challenges that
need to be resolved before it can be successfully deployed. General SDR challenges
are: security of the SDR terminal, support for third party component configuration,
ensuring that radiated emissions of the radio conform with regulations.
The problem I address is that of secure and automated conﬁguration of an SDR
terminal. It is automated because it supports plug-n-play software components sup-
plied by diﬀerent vendors and the blueprint for composing them, called conﬁguration
proﬁle, also can be supplied by any certiﬁed software provider. It should satisfy the
basic security properties identiﬁed by the threat model. RF emissions of commercial
equipment is regulated by FCC. There are strict FCC rules that need to be adhered
to. We enforce regulations conformity in our system.
18
3.1.1 Conﬁguration Security
Despite its many beneﬁts, reconﬁgurability of SDR may lead to serious security prob-
lems such as unauthorized interception of conﬁguration data and software, malfunc-
tioning radio equipment, and impersonation of terminal or network. Security of SDR
conﬁguration is just as desirable as its automated nature. We specify the threat
model and security requirements of the conﬁguration framework in Chapter 4.
In general, it is essential that the radio functionality of the SDR terminal is not
unintentionally altered or that non-authorized sources do not have access to SDR
related components. For example, software can be introduced into a device that
changes its RF operating characteristics so that it no longer functions within the
regulated constraints (e.g. frequency range, modulation type, output power). Such
changes in RF parameters may be used to launch denial of service (DoS) attacks on
the SDR device or entire wireless network. For instance, such an application could
cause the terminal transmitter to always transmit at maximum power, allowing the
user to get better performance, but at the same time actually degrading the overall
performance of the system.
The challenge is to provide security services for the conﬁguration framework that
ensures integrity, conﬁdentiality, and authentication of relevant data and processes.
Access to conﬁguration functions within the terminal must be safeguarded and also
attempts at fraudulent access from the outside world must be prevented. Conﬁgura-
tion data and software modules must be downloaded in a secure manner from veriﬁed
sources, and the security functions themselves have to be trustworthy.
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3.1.2 Automated Conﬁguration
Previously it was assumed that the conﬁguration setups are pre-deﬁned and pre-
veriﬁed by an external party such as a hardware manufacturer, and they either already
reside in the SDR terminal or are downloaded over-the-air at conﬁguration time [2, 3].
The implication was that software modules composing a particular conﬁguration were
originated from the same vendor, most likely the hardware manufacturer. Since
the software vendor is full aware of the properties and dependencies of the software
modules, it can provide conﬁguration setup that precisely deﬁnes the sequence and
identity of individual components.
The situation becomes complicated when a single radio conﬁguration uses radio soft-
ware modules originating from several, diﬀerent providers. It would be necessary to
compose the radio conﬁguration automatically. The challenge is to provide compo-
sition of radio software components with certain constraints (e.g. user preferences,
regulatory body and network operator requirements, hardware speciﬁcations). These
constraints are provided by machine-readable policies and specify the radio access
technology (e.g. GSM, UMTS), allocated frequency band (e.g. 806-902 MHz) and
hardware parameters (e.g. IF, power, interfaces). The diﬃculty lies in mapping
conﬁguration policies into a functional dataﬂow graph and then, further, into an exe-
cutable dataﬂow graph. The executable dataﬂow graph states which software modules
implement functional blocks, and it is used to activate a new radio conﬁguration.
3.1.3 Conﬁguration Validation
FCC requires each SDR hardware and software combination be tested for certiﬁcation
[6]. This implies that (1) the entire software stack (operating system, signal processing
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software, communication protocols, and applications) must be certiﬁed as a whole,
and (2) the software must be certiﬁed for each type of hardware it intends to couple
with. However, this does not mean the software has to be monolithic.
The challenge is to enforce conformance with regulations in a component-based sys-
tem. The general case of validating a candidate radio conﬁguration to verify that it
does not emit forbidden radio signals is not decidable. If such a validation function
exists, it could be used to solve the halting problem that is known to be undecidable
over Turing machines [17]. The decision problem known as the halting problem can
be informally stated as follows:
Given a description of a program and its initial input, determine whether
the program, when executed on this input, ever halts (completes). The
alternative is that it runs forever without halting.
Theorem 2.3.1. The general configuration validation problem is undecidable.








The RadioConﬁg program calls Halts() that is a program for which it shall be decided
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whether it halts, i.e. the halting problem shall be solved for this program. If Halts()
halts, the program RadioEmit() is called to emit a forbidden signal, and consequently
the program RadioConﬁg would not be valid as it emits a radio signal that is not
allowed. If, however, the program Halts() does not halt, then RadioConﬁg would not
emit a forbidden signal, and therefore it would be a valid radio conﬁguration. As
halting problem is undecided, no radio validation program exists.
Thus, we take more practical approach of checking functional properties and interfaces
of software modules.
3.1.4 Conﬁguration Attestation
The service provider may request a proof of conformity with the standards before
allowing the terminal access to their network. The challenge is to provide a remote
attestation scheme enabling the terminal to prove that its activated conﬁguration
is in compliance with standards and regulations, and not a rogue or malfunctioning
device.
The challenger should be able to determine whether it is: (1) Safe to trust the platform
from which the current state information has originated; (2) Safe to trust the software
environment running on the platform.
3.2 Research Scope
To clarify the communication layer scope of SDR function, lets take a look at the
Open System Interconnection (OSI) reference model. It consists of the following
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seven layers: Physical, Data Link, Network, Transport, Session, Presentation, and
Application. SDR pushes reconﬁgurability further down from the network layer. In
general SDR functionality lies at the Link layer and the Physical layer.
In this work, we deal with digital signal processing functionality of SDR strictly. Thus
we operate strictly at PHY layer, which essentially determines the RF characteristics
of a radio. PHY is the layer that is pre-determined at design time in a traditional
digital radio. However, in SDR, the PHY layer can be changed to suit the appro-
priate radio environment, be it GPS or cellular network. The MAC layer is already
completely in software, thus any MAC layer protocol can be activated on top of SDR
PHY layer, provided the MAC protocol implementation is available on the device.
There are several eﬀorts underway to build MAC protocols for SDRs. Pant et al.
[18] implemented a slotted ALOHA protocol with GNU Radio as the PHY. They
replaced the MAC and PHY layers with a custom MAC based on slotted ALOHA
and PHY using GNU Radio. The MAC and PHY communicate via UNIX domain
sockets. Ethernet frames are passed between the network layer and MAC using the
TAP/TUN interface. Holger von Malm [19] implemented a pure ALOHA and a send-
and-wait ARQ protocol using the GNU Radio framework. The work also evaluates
the performance of the system in terms of latency.
It was pointed out that GNU Radio platform’s current architecture makes it extremely
diﬃcult to develop MAC protocols for it [20, 21]. Since GNU Radio was designed
for signal processing, it does not provide support for maintaining global state. MAC
protocols generally maintain a state machine, which is updated by both the transmit
and receive paths and is used to coordinate access to the shared medium. Moreover,
MAC protocols often need to keep per-ﬂow or per-destination state, e.g. transmission
parameters, ﬂow control information, bandwidth use, etc. Finally, the GNU Radio
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framework lacks the concepts of time and timers. MAC protocols need support for
timers, for example, to implement back oﬀ mechanisms, various interframe gaps, or
TDMA-style gaps.
In this work, we do not seek to make the radios composable in real-time.
Instead, we follow the prevalent practice of stopping the radio and loading new code to
change the radios performance. Real-time composability, where the ability to swiftly
adapt to changing conditions is required, is an important issue related to cognitive
radios [22]. Cognitive radio is able to change its transmission or reception parameters
to communicate eﬃciently avoiding interference with licensed or unlicensed users.
This alteration of parameters is based on the active monitoring of several factors in
the external and internal radio environment, such as radio frequency spectrum, user
behavior and network state. Software radio does not have this capability.
3.3 Assumptions
We assume a communication situation in a spectrum market, where reconﬁguration
of base stations and terminals are permitted. The reconﬁguration software may
be obtained from diﬀerent sources (e.g. third party software vendors, operators,
manufacturers), and reconﬁguration can take place at any time.
We assume that some security elements of SDR terminals are enforced in hardware
to prevent tampering. SDR standards recommend a hardware security mechanism
called Trusted Security Module. TSM provides non-volatile storage for cryptographic
keys and certiﬁcates [23]. The manufacturer inserts cryptographic credentials into
boot ROM during manufacturing; the terminal securely stores the trusted root key
of the manufacturer. We can assume that all SDR terminals are equipped with an
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asymmetric key pair and a certiﬁcate for their public key.
We further assume that some kind of isolation mechanism is provided to protect the
execution environment on the SDR terminal.
3.4 Thesis Statement
Valid configuration of Software Defined Radios supporting third party components
can be achieved through automated composition of signal processing components.
Security and regulations conformity of such devices can be provided through a con-
bination of trusted computing, configuration validation, compatibility check, secure
download, and remote attestation.
3.5 Success Criteria
As stated earlier in this chapter, we address a range of problems concerning reconﬁg-
urability of software deﬁned radio. The solution to each problem is evaluated based
on its feasibility, correctness, and eﬃciency. In addition, we propose the following
criteria to evaluate this thesis:
• Does the composition algorithm scale?
• Is it able to handle conﬁguration proﬁles where some parameters are missing?
• Does the resulting conﬁgured radio function properly?
• Is the XML template for conﬁguration proﬁle and component description ex-
pressive enough?
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• Is it feasible to prove that composite of certiﬁable components is also certiﬁable?
• Does the secure download protocol satisfy integrity and conﬁdentiality proper-
ties?
• Does the proposed trusted SDR platform guarantee platform integrity?




We deﬁne security in a broad sense as that system attribute that maintains the
privacy and integrity of the system and the information distributed across it. It in-
cludes mechanisms to ensure accurate content delivery to intended recipients, denial
of interception by intruders, rejection of attempts to gain unauthorized access, mech-
anisms for conﬁguration management of software download, and record-keeping with
non-repudiation of actions taken by all participants.
The design of communication system security must consider the potential threats,
and trade oﬀ the cost of meeting threats with the probability of encountering them
and the loss if they are successful. It is also necessary to evaluate the cost of a
successful penetration. Interception of a cryptographic key, for example has more
far-reaching consequences than retrieving transitory data, such as the current selling
price of a stock.
One of our main goals of this thesis is to provide security for SDR conﬁguration. We
need to understand the dimensions and objectives of our system security. In this
chapter we deﬁne the threat model we used to identify and describe security threats.
Then we present example of threat scenarios that pertain to a SDR terminal. Finally
we identify security requirements for SDR conﬁguration.
We do not attempt to summarize all of the threats and security requirements of the
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various wireless standards. Instead, we adopted a model that can be used to classify
speciﬁc threats to SDR-based communications systems.
4.1 Threat Model
Providers, vendors, and users of mobile wireless systems need assurance that the sys-
tem will perform the tasks allocated to it without compromise. In general, regarding
a system security they expect that a system will:
• Protect Content - Most users participate in communications systems because
they are interested in the content of the traﬃc. Diﬀerent types of content are
subject to diﬀerent threats. Some speciﬁc issues to address are privacy, funds
transfer, and intellectual property rights.
• Provide Regulatory Conformance - Because there is a great deal of con-
tention for use of the electromagnetic spectrum regulators are interested in
maintaining control of how it is used, and for certifying that radio equipment
meets their emission speciﬁcations. Issues to address are: initial certiﬁcation,
delivery/download, and veriﬁcation.
• Protect Operating Information - Operating information is information used
by the system, not communication content. Types of operating information:
radio parameters, signaling/control, keys and passwords, traﬃc volumes, user
identity and location.
• Protect Billing and Payment - The mobile terminal carried by system users
has a potential for use in making payment for goods and services. The system
security mechanisms must be adequate for accurate billing and payment. Is-
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sues to address are reliable payment for services, credit card transactions, and
prepaid funds control.
From these security concerns, providing regulatory conformance and protecting op-
erating information pertains most to SDR conﬁguration. Our system ensures that
the radio conﬁguration complies with FCC regulations on device emissions and certi-
ﬁcation requirements for SDR. It also protects conﬁguration information. We discuss
the security requirements for SDR conﬁguration in Section 4.3.
We use a four-part model shown in Table 4.1 describe and categorize security threats.
Point of Attack Access Mode Perpetrator Motive Security Violation
Table 4.1: Security threat model.
Point of Attack refers to the device or system component within the communication
system where the security breach occurs. It is not necessarily the same as the target
of the attack. For example, the target could be terminals operating within a wireless
network, whereas the point of the attack could be the network that provides services
to those terminals. The following points of attack are considered in this model:
• Terminal: The security breach occurs at the handset or other terminal equip-
ment.
• Infrastructure: The security breach occurs within the Radio Access Network
or Core Network.
Access Mode refers to the means by which the perpetrator obtains access to the
Point of Attack.
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• Physical: the threat requires physical control of, or access to, the device or
network entity.
• Remote: the threat can be perpetrated remotely, by exploiting some external
interface to the device or network entity, including wireless interfaces.
Perpetrator Motive refers to the motivation of the party responsible for the threat-
ening action.
• Negligent: accidentally harmful consequences of a legitimate action. (e.g. the
download of authenticated software which contains an unintentional software
“bug”).
• Unauthorized: unintentionally harmful consequence of an improper or unau-
thorized action. (e.g. download of unauthorized black market software which
is advertised to “boost” handset performance).
• Malicious: deliberate, improper action, speciﬁcally intended to cause harmful
consequences.
Security Violation refers to the category of action taken by a perpetrator.
• Impersonation: Pretending to make the system think that access is being
attempted by a legitimate user. The attack can be further categorized as im-
personating a user, impersonating a network, and man-in-the-middle.
• Unauthorized Access: Extracting data from the system or injection data into
the system by means other than impersonation. These attacks are attempts to
get around the normal barriers to unauthorized access rather than dupe them.
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The attack can be further categorized as interception, unauthorized access to
control, and unauthorized access to data.
• Denial of Service: Performing an operation or a series of operations that
consume system resources to the extent that performance is reduced. Or ﬁnding
a way to alter system parameters so that one or more users are wrongfully denied
access.
• Interference with other Services: widespread performance impairment of,
or improper access to, other networks or services.
• Digital Rights Violation: Unauthorized access to, or theft of, digital content
and software.
4.2 Matrix of Threat Scenarios
In Table 4.2 we present several examples of SDR security threats, and illustrate how
the four-part model can be used to classify a given threat. We proposed a threat
modeling approach for speciﬁc types of systems in [24], and identiﬁed most of these
threats in our earlier work [25]. A wireless base station or handset, employing SDR
technologies, should be protected against these threats.
This matrix is by no means an exhaustive list of threats. There are threats such as
fraudulent use of network services, masquerading as a communications participant,
or traﬃc analysis that apply to any mobile wireless system but are outside the scope
of this thesis. The above identiﬁed threats serve as valuable basis to derive security
objectives and requirements of our conﬁguration framework described in the next
chapter.
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4.3 Security Requirements for SDR
Conﬁguration
In this section we identify security requirements for the conﬁguration of SDR termi-
nal. Each of these requirements address several of the threats that pertain to SDR
conﬁguration, and if properly implemented will eﬀectively mitigate these threats. We
surveyed best practices established by security experts [26, 27, 28, 29, 23, 30], and
performed our own analysis to compile the list of threats and requirements.
The main requirement, or “the mother of all requirements” is this:
An SDR device MUST provide a secure conﬁguration control.
The individual requirements that apply to SDR conﬁguration and deliberate on the
above main requirement are:
• Conﬁguration integrity- An SDR device SHALL detect the unauthorized
modiﬁcation of SDR conﬁguration software. This prevents a hacker from chang-
ing the device conﬁguration.
• Regulatory conformance- An SDR device SHALL ensure that its RF emis-
sions (transmit frequency, power output, modulation format) are limited to
those of regulations. It SHALL only install and instantiate SDR-related soft-
ware that has been appropriately certiﬁed to be compliant with FCC regula-
tions.
• Device attestation- An SDR device SHALL provide trusted conﬁguration
information to its communications service providers on request.
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• Secure download- A secure infrastructure MUST be provided to provide con-
ﬁdentiality and integrity services for download of SDR-related software and
conﬁguration data. All software components MUST be cryptographically veri-
ﬁed before they are executed. At minimum this should be done at start-up.
• Secure execution environment- Process separation methodology SHOULD
be provided to ensure that third-party software components could not access
memory or modify operation of the conﬁguration process.
• Private cryptographic keys MUST be stored securely. This allows the equipment
to securely identify itself.
• Public cryptographic keys (root keys) used to verify certiﬁcates MUST be stored
so that the value cannot be modiﬁed.
• Cryptographic mechanisms- The cryptographic level of the algorithms used
SHOULD be consistent with the current state of the art and designed to prevent
a dedicated attacker from using weaknesses in the algorithms to modify the
speciﬁed operation of the equipment.
These security requirements shall be satisﬁed through suitable functional and security
mechanisms in the proposed conﬁguration framework. For some of these requirements
we propose our own unique approaches. For others we adopted suitable security
mechanisms that already work well for other types of computer systems. We assume
that the following requirements are implemented on any SDR terminal:
• The equipment SHOULD include a unique non-alterable identiﬁer (Serial Num-
ber). This enables certiﬁcates to be linked securely to the device.
• Watchdog processes MUST be used to insure that processors are executing
instructions correctly and that software routines are not locked up.
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1 Disreputable parties modify device
software, causing them to trans-
mit and/or receive on diﬀerent fre-
quencies, for example a military
band, thus enabling covert communi-
cations, eavesdropping, or jamming.
Terminal Physical Malicious Interference
2 A new release of software inadver-
tently contains a ”bug” and is dis-
tributed to users in the network. The
bug causes terminals to reset unex-
pectedly, or change its conﬁguration,
causing widespread denial of service.
Terminal Remote Negligent Denial of
Service
3 A sophisticated hacker creates and
distributes a virus or malicious appli-
cation that causes widespread inter-
ference to the eﬀected or other com-
munication systems, such as pub-
lic safety, emergency, and navigation
control communication systems.
Terminal Remote Malicious Interference
4 A black market company creates
and distributes a rogue application
which causes an SDR terminal to
deviate from its normal per-
formance limits, and in so doing,
causes widespread disruption of ser-
vice to the eﬀected communication
system.
Terminal Remote Unauthorized Denial of
Service
5 An unethical company intercepts
software downloaded to phones op-
erating in the network, and illegally
re-uses the software to build and sell
black market devices.
Terminal Remote Malicious Digital
Rights
6 An unethical company modiﬁes the
electronic identiﬁer information on
phones intended for sale in one coun-
try, and proﬁtably resells the phones
in another country where the sale is
not legal. (As an example: low cost
phones with reduced spectral emis-
sion speciﬁcations may be legal in
one country, but illegal in another
country).
Terminal Physical Unauthorized Interference
7 An unethical company takes in old
model phones, illegally reprograms
and resells the devices as ”new”
on the black market. The hard-
ware/software combination of the
modiﬁed phones is unreliable, and
causes the devices to eventually
”crash” (i.e. suﬀer an unrecoverable
failure)
Terminal Physical Unauthorized Denial of
Service




Early implementations of SDR terminals were based on the vertical model in which
the operational mode is merely switched between two or more independent imple-
mentations of air interface standards. Current developments are aiming at truly re-
conﬁgurable software architectures, where the goal is to provide open programmable
software and hardware platforms and to deﬁne any implementation of the terminal
purely by software conﬁguration.
In order to rapidly and easily support multiple radio modes within a wide spectrum,
software radio uses reconﬁgurable software programs running on generic hardware
and operating system (such as POSIX platforms) to perform radio signal processing.
To facilitate the rapidly composable and reconﬁgurable requirements, SDR waveform
applications are commonly architected as composites wired up from software compo-
nents. This component-based radio architecture facilitates a plug-n-play waveform
composition where components can be supplied by third party vendors.
To facilitate a plug-n-play component composition and make the conﬁguration speci-
ﬁcation portable, we propose an automated conﬁguration methodology for SDR. The
core of the methodology is a conﬁguration processor which composes DSP compo-
nents according to a conﬁguration speciﬁcation of the desired radio mode.
In this chapter, ﬁrst I give a schematic view of the conﬁguration process along with
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an example scenario in Section 5.1. Then I deﬁne DSP component model and compo-
sition model in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3 I discuss the model and representation of
conﬁguration proﬁle. Finally in Section 5.4 I present the evaluation of the automated
conﬁguration methodology.
5.1 Conﬁguration Process
As stated earlier, the automated conﬁguration consists of two main steps. In the ﬁrst
step, the conﬁguration processor composes a functional graph based on a waveform
design and conﬁguration policies. The functional graph is stored as a conﬁguration
proﬁle in a machine-readable portable format. In the second step, the processor maps
the functional graph into an executable graph which connects software components
through compatible ports. But this is a very high-level overview of the conﬁguration
scheme. In this section, we describe the conﬁguration process in detail and expose
the issues we had to address while implementing our framework.
Remember that the ﬁrst stage of the two-step conﬁguration scheme takes place oﬀ-
the-terminal. Figure 5.1 displays the ﬂowchart of the conﬁguration process at an
SDR terminal. We can describe it as a sequence of the following events:
(1) The user or network provider requests a reconﬁguration of the SDR terminal. The
request should contain the name or identiﬁer of the desired waveform. For example:
FM Broadcast Receiver. The request may also provide one or more conﬁguration
parameters, such as the frequency band to listen to. These parameters are user
preferences and become part of the conﬁguration policy. Since we enforce the most
restrictive policy, user preferences will not relax other policies such as the network
provider’s policies.
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(2) The system tries to retrieve a conﬁguration proﬁle for the requested radio mode.
If found, go to the next step. Otherwise the system attempts to download it. At user
level applications, download decision can be made in many ways: ask the user, follow
preset user preferences, check whether download source is speciﬁed and available.
Conﬁguration proﬁles can be downloaded from the network provider, or a trusted
vendor. The download channel should be secured, the supplier’s identify should be
authenticated, and the downloaded proﬁle should be validated for FCC compliance.
We address these issues in the next chapter. Templates are usually generated by
radio experts. We discuss proﬁles in more detail in Section 5.3. After downloading
the proﬁle, the conﬁguration process resumes.
(3) The parser parses the conﬁguration proﬁle and generates a functional graph in
the radio environment’s address space. The parser is an XML parser. Each node in
the functional graph indicates the functionality of the component, i.e. a component
class from our classiﬁcation system. For example: Quadrature Demodulator. All
input parameters for components are also speciﬁed in the conﬁguration proﬁle.
(4) We can start the composition of the candidate graph. We try to ﬁnd a matching
software component for each functional component, starting from the ﬁrst node in
the dependency chain.
(5) Search the terminal’s repository of software components for a matching compo-
nent. We only need to parse component descriptors which specify the class of the
component, its parameters, and input/output types. We discussed component de-
scriptors in Section 5.2.2. If the software component repository is small enough, it
could be preloaded into the system’s memory to speed the search. If we ﬁnd at least
one match whose class, parameters, and input/output ports match the functional
component’s class then proceed to the next step. Otherwise, the conﬁguration pro-
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cess must terminate since we are unable to generate a complete executable graph that
implements the full functionality of the desired radio mode.
(6) At this point we are composing a candidate graph. A candidate graph is similar
to the executable graph, except its each node is a set of software components that all
implement the same functional component. We will analyze the candidate graph later
to derive the best executable graph optimized for the conﬁguration requirements.
(7) Check to see whether conﬁguration policies are loaded into the system. If so, go
to the next step. Otherwise, parse and load the policies. Network’s policies should
be stored in machine-readable ﬁles, e.g. XML. In this stage of conﬁguration, by
conﬁguration policies we mean network policies and user preferences. These contain
rules and preferences that are enforced in the radio conﬁguration.
(8) Once we have a complete candidate graph, it is time to perform a consistency
check. Also the conﬁguration proﬁle has been certiﬁed, we check to ensure the cor-
rectness of the conﬁguration proﬁle and accuracy of component descriptor. We check
whether a component’s input port type is consistent with the output port type of the
preceding component. If the consistency check fails, we notify the user or application
layer and quite the conﬁguration process.
(9) Some conﬁguration parameters that do not eﬀect the waveform’s emissions might
not be speciﬁed in the conﬁguration proﬁle. It is up to the user and network to set
these parameters, or let the system set default values. The network’s policies might
indicate which version of a DSP software to use, which channel to tune to for control
information, or what bandwidth width works best in the local environment. There
might be very few parameters that the user is allowed to set due to FCC regulations.
The user for example, can set the frequency of AM/FM broadcast receivers, spec-
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ify which soundcard or peripheral devices should should serve as the sink (the last
component of SDR execution graph).
(10) If we have a full candidate graph, i.e. it contains at least one component in each
set, then select one valid path from the candidate graph. This is the resulting ﬁnal
executable graph. We select the best path based on the conﬁguration parameters.
The user maybe provided with an opportunity to select a path. Or the system could
choose the ﬁrst valid path found. Presenting all possible candidates to the user might
be too costly- the mapping algorithm’s running time would become exponential.
Above we described the process of automatically re-conﬁguring an SDR terminal.
We mapped the conﬁguration proﬁle of the requested radio mode into an executable
graph, which upon execution realizes a new radio conﬁguration. You will notice that
during the conﬁguration process we perform two types of checks: (1) Consistency
check to ensure that the conﬁguration’s components are compatible with each other,
and (2) check the component descriptions and their parameters against the conﬁgu-
ration policies.
5.1.1 Conﬁguration Example: FM Receiver
Conﬁguring FM broadcast receiver is a classic example favored by the GNU Radio
community. It has few and simple components and easy to understand for anybody.
I refer to this example throughout this thesis. When presenting the processes and
models of the secure conﬁguration framework, I explain how it applies to FM receiver
conﬁguration. Figure 5.2 illustrates how the composition model presented in Section
5.2.1 applies to this example.
First, the system received a re-conﬁguration request for a user. The desired waveform
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type and the FM broadcasting channel to tune to are passed as the arguments of the
request command. The user wants to conﬁgure the SDR terminal as a FM radio
receiver, and wants to listen to the 91.5 MHz station. It is easy to check that the user
request is in compliance with FCC rules. FCC allocated the frequency band 88.0-
108.0 MHz for FM radio broadcasting, and there is no power limit on the receiver.
This is why when experimenting with GNU Radio platform together with an RF
front-end hardware, many people use this example. No licensing is required.
The system retrieves the conﬁguration proﬁle of the FM receiver, identifying it by
the waveform type. Conﬁguration proﬁles contain the type of the waveform it con-
ﬁgures, and a list of components and parameters in the order they appear in the
dependency chain. Here I just show you a graphical representation of the functional
graph expressed in the proﬁle. In Section 5.3.3 you can see the XML speciﬁcation of
the conﬁguration proﬁle.
The conﬁguration processor parses the conﬁguration proﬁle, creates a functional
graph, and generates candidate executable graphs. After applying the conﬁguration
policies such as user preferences, the processor generates an executable graph. You
can see in the Figure 5.2 that each functional component is mapped into a software
component. For example, the Channel Filter is mapped into a software compo-
nent called gr.freq xlating fir filter. The match is made based on the software
component’s class type, which is Channel Filter. The processor checks whether the
ﬁlter component’s input/output port types are consistent with that of its adjacent
components in the graph. Its input type is short, which is the same as the output
type of the RF front-end. Its output type is complex, which is the same as the input
type of the quadrature demodulator.
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5.2 Modeling Conﬁguration Concepts
The core of our automated conﬁguration methodology consists of a hierarchical con-
ﬁguration process and a conﬁguration processor that drives it. To better present
this methodology, several abstract concepts need to be outlined. In this section,
I formulate three concepts that play a signiﬁcant role in our automated conﬁgura-
tion strategy. These are component composition model, DSP component model, and
mapping of conﬁguration graphs.
5.2.1 Composition Model
The end goal of radio conﬁguration is to compose a pipeline of DSP software mod-
ules that process incoming or outgoing signal stream of SDR. In our conﬁguration
approach, we compose this pipeline in two main steps. In step one, the conﬁgura-
tion processor takes a waveform design of the desired radio mode and conﬁguration
policies, and creates a functional graph. We call this functional graph a conﬁgura-
tion proﬁle because it makes it possible to port this description to compatible radio
platforms and compose an executable DSP chain. The conﬁguration policies are con-
straints and rules that need to be enforced when parameterizing and validating the
conﬁguration proﬁle. The functional graph is a DAG where each node identiﬁes a
DSP component by its class and parameters.
In step two, the processor maps the functional graph into an executable graph that
activates the requested waveform when executed by the radio runtime environment.
The executable graph is a DAG where each node is a software implementation of a
DSP component. If suitable software components cannot be found in a local software
repository of the SDR terminal, they need to be downloaded from an authorized
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software vendor or the network provider. Thus, we can model the conﬁguration
composition as a 2-tier hierarchical mapping problem. Figure 5.3 depicts the graphical
view of the composition model.
To apply conﬁguration policies in the conﬁguration composition, we need to consoli-
date them. The conﬁguration policies are consolidated following the principle: When
two or more policies are attempting to control the same functionality or parameter,
the most restrictive policy should rule. For example, a radio equipment is capable to
transmit at up to 5 watts of output power, and FCC limits this particular type of
radio’s output power to 1 watt when operating in 88-108 MHz frequency band. Then
when transmitting in the 88-108 MHz band, this SDR terminal must not exceed its
power level more than 1 watt.
A conﬁguration proﬁle speciﬁes the order and type of DSP components used to process
a signal stream. Each DSP component applies some kind of mathematical function
on the input stream. For example, if the desired radio access technology is GSM,
its corresponding conﬁguration proﬁle speciﬁes the order and types of modulators,
encoders, and ﬁlters used for processing receive or transmit signals. We assume most
common conﬁguration proﬁles come pre-installed from the equipment manufacturer,
but they also can be downloaded from an external entity when a need arises. The
consolidated policies serve for tuning the input and output parameters of DSP com-
ponents described in a conﬁguration proﬁle.
5.2.2 Component Model
There are two types of component models we deal with. Both are a part of a wave-
form, but at a diﬀerent level. One is the component composing a functional graph,
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the other is in an executable graph. They are quite similar, except the functional
component does not have a source code. The executable graph’s component is a small
software module, called a digital signal processor. Next, we describe the model of
this component.
A software component, denoted by si, is a self-contained computational unit pro-
viding a certain functionality (e.g. modulation, ﬁltering, phase shifting). Figure 5.4
illustrates its graphical model. Each software component has typed input ports and
output ports. Each ports is associated with a buﬀer used to dump the output stream
or read in the input stream. In other words, each port is typed by the data it ac-
cepts or transmits. Each software component consists of (1) a function name Ni, (2)
software code Code, and (3) a component descriptor CDi.
A component descriptor is not necessarily contained within the software component.
Rather it is usually implemented as an XML ﬁle associated with the component. A
component descriptor consists of (a) a component class name Fi, (b) input port types
T ini , (c) output port types T
out
i , and (d) parameters it accepts Pi = {pi1, ..., pin}. We
formally deﬁne a software component and component descriptor as follows,
Deﬁnition 5.2.1. A software component is defined as si = 〈Ni, Code, CDi〉, where
Ni represents the provided software function name, Code defines the function imple-
mentation, and CDi represents component descriptor.
Deﬁnition 5.2.2. A component descriptor is defined as CDi = 〈Fi, T ini , T outi , Pi〉,
where Fi represents the component class name, T
in
i is input port type, T
out
i is output
port type, and Pi represents a set of parameters it accepts.
Similarly, we can deﬁne a functional component.
Deﬁnition 5.2.3. A functional component is defined as fi = 〈Fi, T ini , T outi , Pi〉,
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where Fi represents the component class name, T
in
i is input port type, T
out
i is output
port type, and Pi represents a set of parameters it accepts.
5.2.3 Conﬁguration Graph Model
We adopt a synchronous dataﬂow graph model [31] widely used in signal processing
applications to specify the functional and executable graphs of conﬁguration. This
model consists of a set of components S = {s1, ..., st} and a set of directed edges
E ⊆ S × S such that si → sj denotes a data dependency of si on sj.
Deﬁnition 5.2.4. A functional graph is defined as a directed acyclic graph Gf(F,E),
where F = {f1, ..., fn} is a set of functional components and E ⊆ F × F is a set of
directed edges.
Deﬁnition 5.2.5. An executable graph is defined as a directed acyclic graph G(e(S,E),
where S = {s1, ..., sn} is a set of software components and E ⊆ S × S is a set of di-
rected edges.
We also deﬁne a candidate graph. When the conﬁguration processor is assembling
an executable graph based on a conﬁguration proﬁle’s functional graph, often it ﬁnds
a set of software components that meet the speciﬁcation. To optimize the decision
making without backtracking, the processor ﬁrst composes a candidate graph, then
applies network provider’s or user’s preferences and policies to select the optimal
executable graph. The candidate graph may have a set of components at each node.
Deﬁnition 5.2.6. A candidate graph is defined as a directed acyclic graph Gc(C,E),
where C = {c1, ..., cn} is a set of composite nodes, ci = {si1, ..., sim} is a set of
software components, and E ⊆ C × C is a set of directed edges.
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The problem of mapping a functional graph into an executable graph can be stated
as follows:
Given a functional graph Gf and the set of configuration policies such as
network policies and user preferences, first compose a candidate graph Gc
where fi = CDij for ∀fi ∈ Gf , ∀sij ∈ ci, and ∀ci ∈ Gc. Then, select
an executable graph Ge such that Gc ⇒ Ge optimizes the configuration
requirements.
Note that the conﬁguration requirements used to compose an executable graph are
diﬀerent from the ones used while composing a functional graph based on FCC rules
and hardware speciﬁcations. The functional graph expressed in a conﬁguration de-
scriptor is not composed on an SDR terminal. This is due to FCC requirement to
certify each software and hardware combination. We explain this in detail in Chapter
6. Conﬁguration proﬁles are generated by SDR experts, oﬀ-the-terminal.
5.3 Conﬁguration Proﬁle
In this section, we discuss the concept of conﬁguration proﬁle as it pertains to our
conﬁguration framework. A conﬁguration proﬁle serves as basis for composing the
right components for the radio. It identiﬁes the components by their class, and
speciﬁes the dependency order of these components. It is a blueprint of a radio
design, expressed in XML. First we introduce our component classiﬁcation system,
then give a brief overview of XML.
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5.3.1 Component Classiﬁcation
Most software radios use similar hardware for the RF and modem sub-systems. For
example, most radio systems include a modulator, an antenna system, a mixer, and
an ampliﬁer. From this assumption we can group common hardware and software
components into speciﬁc classes. From these classes, APIs can be developed to provide
a basic function set for the individual classes. Providing the developers of hardware
and software components with a component classiﬁcation system not only promotes
the portability of the components by forcing components to provide basic functions,
but allows the software radio to clearly identify a basic set of services provided by
the component by simply identifying the components classiﬁcation.
Such classiﬁcations include: amplifier, mixer, demodulator, modulator, antenna
system, filter, and several others. In our conﬁguration framework on GNU Radio
platform, we use more speciﬁc classes such as quadrature demodulator, frequency
modulator, channel filter, audio filter, low pass filter, RF front-end,
and audio sink. We use several of these component classes in our FM Receiver ex-
ample presented throughout this thesis.
The set of classiﬁcation types must be a standardized set in which developers must
agree to classify their components into. Essentially a simple API is developed for
each classiﬁcation. This API includes only the basic functions and attributes that
every component with the speciﬁc classiﬁcation must provide to the radio system.
Table 5.1 below provides an example API for an ampliﬁer component classiﬁcation:
In addition to the control functions the components provide, the attributes that allow
external control must have operational limits. As Table 5.1 shows, each controllable
attribute has a maximum and minimum limit. These limits must be provided to
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Identiﬁer Type Description
dutyCycle attribute Speciﬁes duty cycle for speciﬁc am-
pliﬁer.
maxGain attribute Speciﬁes the maximum operational
gain for speciﬁc ampliﬁer.
minGain attribute Speciﬁes the minimum operational
gain for speciﬁc ampliﬁer.
gain attribute Current operating gain.
setGain function Function provided to set the cur-
rent gain.
getGain function Function provided to get the cur-
rent gain.
getDutyCycle function Function provided to get the duty
cycle.
getMaxGain function Function provided to get the maxi-
mum gain.
getMinGain function Function provided to get the mini-
mum gain.
Table 5.1: API of ampliﬁer class component.
ensure the hardware components do not operate outside of its operation range which
could possibly damage itself permanently. These limits may also be provided to
ensure the radio components stay within the legal limits according to the geographical
location of the radio system.
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5.3.2 XML Overview
We use Extensible Markup Language (XML) in our conﬁguration framework. In our
system, the component descriptors, conﬁguration policies, and conﬁguration proﬁles
are expressed in XML. You see the examples of these documents throughout this
thesis. In this section we provide a short overview of XML.
XML is a markup language for documents containing structured information. Struc-
tured information contains both content (words, pictures, etc.) and some indication
of what role that content plays (for example, content in a section heading has a diﬀer-
ent meaning from content in a footnote.). Almost all documents have some structure.
A markup language is a mechanism to identify structures in a document. The XML
speciﬁcation deﬁnes a standard way to add markup to documents. Unlike HTML,
the set of tags in XML is ﬂexible; the tag syntax is deﬁned by a documents associated
DTDs. In fact, XML is really a meta-language for describing markup languages. In
other words, XML provides a facility to deﬁne tags and the structural relationships
between them. Since theres no predeﬁned tag set, there cant be any preconceived se-
mantics. All of the semantics of an XML document will be deﬁned by the applications
that process them.
The parsing of the XML ﬁles into Python is done using a standard Python XML
package PyXML, which utilizes eXpat, a widely used open-source XML parser [32].
5.3.3 Template for Conﬁguration Proﬁle
A conﬁguration proﬁle serves as a blueprint in the conﬁguration process. A conﬁgu-
ration proﬁle speciﬁes the order and type of mathematical functions used to process a
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signal stream. For example, if the desired radio access technology is GSM, its corre-
sponding conﬁguration proﬁle speciﬁes the order and types of modulators, encoders,
and ﬁlters used for processing receive or transmit signals.
Earlier, in Section 5.1.1 we gave an example of a conﬁguration process. Figure 5.2 dis-
plays a schematic view of the FM receiver conﬁguration. The functional graph consists
of these components and in that order: RF Front-End, Channel Filter, Quadrature
Demodulator, Audio Filter, and Audio Sink. These functional names indicate the
class of the component. The conﬁguration proﬁle of the FM receiver must contain
this information. A proﬁle makes automated conﬁguration possible, and supports
portability of radio designs across various hardware and software platforms for SDR.
A conﬁguration proﬁle must contain at the minimum: (1) type of the radio, (2)
functional component list, and (3) conﬁguration parameters and their values. Op-
tionally, parameters that do not have speciﬁc values can indicate a range. For some
components, specially for components that control a hardware, a name or model of
the component can be speciﬁed. It is quite simple to represent the functionality
of a radio in XML. We predeﬁned a set of tags for this purpose: ConﬁgTemplate,
RadioType, Components, ComponentClass, Parameters, Parameter. Their usage is
self-explanatory. Figure 5.5 shows the XML representation of the FM Receiver con-
ﬁguration proﬁle.
There should be a standardized set of radio mode such as FM Broadcast Receiver, AM
Broadcast Receiver, GPS Receiver, FM Transmitter, Bluetooth Transceiver, 802.11
Transceiver etc. For some of these types of radios, it is not enough to conﬁgure
the waveform, which is the PHY layer of the wireless device and deals with raw bits.
Changing a waveform or signal processing pipeline only changes how bits are encoded
in radio waves. For technologies like Bluetooth and 802.11, it is also necessary to load
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and ﬁre up the corresponding MAC layer protocols in order to establish a meaningful
communication.
5.4 Evaluation
We implemented the conﬁguration processor on GNU Radio platform. The main con-
trol software is implemented in Python and DSP component library is implemented
C++. See Chapter 8 for more details on the implementation platform. We devel-
oped the automated conﬁguration methodology outlined in Figure 5.1 in Python lan-
guage. Conﬁguration proﬁles, DSP component descriptors, hardware speciﬁcations,
user preferences, network policies, and FCC rules were expressed in XML ﬁles.
Evaluation of the automated conﬁguration methodology was performed in two parts:
(1) Running time of the composition algorithm is scalable as number of components
increases, and (1) Generated composition of components functions properly.
5.4.1 Performance Time
For the ﬁrst evaluation, we measured the performance time for composing an exe-
cutable graph based on an XML template. We did not introduce any consistencies
with policies or duplicated components. Thus the performance time reﬂects the time
to parse an XML template and components descriptions, search for matching com-
ponents, and add it to the gnuradio ﬂowgraph. Python uses its powerful reﬂection
capability to reference functions without knowing their name until runtime. This
makes it possible to deﬁne a new ﬂowgraph at runtime. Figure 5.6 illustrates the
conﬁguration time for a graph consisting of 2, 3, 4, 5 nodes.
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5.4.2 Radio Functionality
For the second evaluation, we automatically conﬁgured an FM broadcast receiver
tuned to FM 94.5 MHz radio station. Instead of passing the data to a soundcard, we
directed it the GNU Radio’s spectrum analyzer, fftsink, which uses the fast Fourier
transform (FFT) algorithm to extract characteristics of the input signal. Figure 5.7
shows the output of the quadrature demodulator. We see a normal FM radio audio
signal with a peak at 19kHz, which is the stereo pilot tone.
The executable graph generated by the automated conﬁguration method can be di-
rectly executed by the radio runtime environment since it is already compiled and
loaded. Also the system can generate the script of the executable graph and store it
in a ﬁle to be loaded later if necessary. Below you can view the Python script of the
FM receiver conﬁguration.
#!/usr/bin/env python
# Configuration script for FM broadcast receiver.
from gnuradio import gr
from gnuradio import audio
from gnuradio import mc4020
import sys
def build_graph (rf_freq):







# Create the flowgraph
fg = gr.flow_graph ()
# The signal source is mc4020 microtuner with high-speed ADC
rf_front_end = mc4020.source (input_rate, mc4020.MCC_CH3_EN |
mc4020.MCC_ALL_1V)
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# Tell the front end to tune to rf_freq.
rf_front_end.set_RF_freq (rf_freq)
# Select the channel
channel_filter = gr.freq_xlating_fir_filter_scf (fir_decimation,
IF_freq, input_rate)
# Extract the data signal from the baseband signal
fm_demodulator = gr.quadrature_demod_cf (fm_demod_gain)
# filter out certain audio information
audio_filter = gr.fir_filter_fff (audio_decimation)
# sound card as final sink
audio_sink = audio.sink (audio_rate)







if len (args) == 1:
# get station frequency from command line
rf_freq = float (args[0]) * 1e6
# build the flow graph
fg = build_graph (rf_freq)
fg.start ()
raw_input (’Press Enter to quit: ’)
fg.stop ()
if __name__ == ’__main__’:
main (sys.argv[1:])
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Figure 5.1: Flowchart of the conﬁguration process.
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Figure 5.2: Conﬁguring a FM broadcast receiver.
Figure 5.3: Conﬁguration Composition Model.
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<RadioType> FM Broadcast Receiver </RadioType>
<Components>
<Component>










































Figure 5.5: XML template of FM receiver conﬁguration proﬁle.
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Figure 5.6: FM radio signal received by GNU Radio.




In Chapter 4 we stated that one of the security requirements for SDR conﬁguration is
to provide regulatory conformance. Federal Communication Commission (FCC) reg-
ulates radiation emissions by SDR devices [33]. For example, the maximum radiated
power of unlicensed radio FM transmitters within 88-108 MHz band cannot exceed
0.1 watts. For traditional digital or analog radio devices, regulatory conformance is
not an issue once the device is certiﬁed since the device is not capable of changing its
RF parameters, therefore will not exceed its normal operating limits.
We consider certiﬁcation of reconﬁgurable devices such as SDR, and address this
issue within the conﬁguration framework. At the time of writing this thesis, FCC
requires each SDR hardware and software combination be tested for certiﬁcation [6].
This implies that (1) the entire software stack (operating system, signal processing
software, communication protocols, and applications) must be certiﬁed as a whole,
and (2) the software must be certiﬁed for each type of hardware it intends to couple
with. This severely limits the widespread application of SDR equipment.
We are optimistic that given a reconﬁguration methodology with high assurance
for conformity, in time FCC might adopt new regulations that fully supports the
reconﬁgurable nature of SDR. We postulate that it is possible to certify a component-
based SDR terminal where the operating software, digital signal processing (DSP)
software components, and configuration description are decoupled. An open scheme
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for conformance validation will allow the entrance of new players to the SDR market.
In this chapter we present a methodology for component-based certiﬁcation which
assures SDR terminal’s conformity based on a separate certiﬁcation of its hardware,
radio operating environment, third party software, and conﬁguration proﬁle. In Sec-
tion 6.1 we outline the component-based certiﬁcation process. Then in Section 6.2
we present a secure download protocol based on trusted computing functionality. In
Section 6.3 we discuss how to verify regulatory conformance of downloaded software.
Finally in Section 6.4 we discuss pragmatic check for detecting software compatibility.
6.1 SDR Certiﬁcation
Certiﬁcation is a common technique used to solve trust problems among parties where
information asymmetries exist. It is often more eﬃcient than relying simply on market
factors such as reputation and warranties. The purpose of certiﬁcation is to establish
a certain level of assurance that a speciﬁc product conforms to its speciﬁcations.
Equipment to be used in commercial service must pass a set of qualiﬁcation tests to
receive a regulatory certiﬁcation. Procedures for doing so in the US have recently
been changed by the FCC to accommodate SDRs. The current requirement is that
each combination of hardware and software must be certiﬁed together. The primary
justiﬁcation for mandating joint testing of hardware and software is that this is the
only way at the present time to ensure that equipment complies with the technical
standards in the FCC rules to prevent interference and to protect users from excessive
RF radiation.
Anticipating a widespread push for open architectures, we propose a methodology for
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component-based certiﬁcation. This scheme supports portable conﬁguration proﬁles
and third party components.
6.1.1 Component-Based Certiﬁcation
We can view a basic SDR terminal architecture as a hierarchy of hardware, platform
software, and DSP software. Platform software is the base software or ﬁrmware pro-
vided by the manufacturer. Platform software consists of an operating system, device
drivers, and other critical software such as the conﬁguration processor. DSP software
currently running on a terminal consists of DSP software components assembled ac-
cording to a conﬁguration proﬁle.
In order to certify an entire SDR device for conformance, each of these components
need to be certiﬁed, and the integrity of the new conﬁguration should be satisﬁed.
Using a pre-certiﬁed fully-integrated terminal eliminates the need to test for RF
conformance testing since the system is already certiﬁed by regulatory agency, only
piece by piece. In Section 6.1.2, we assert that this scheme of composable certiﬁcation
is valid with some degree of conﬁdence.
Figure 6.1 gives a simpliﬁed view of the component-based SDR certiﬁcation. We
assume that the initial terminal conﬁguration has already been certiﬁed by the orig-
inal equipment manufacturer. Let’s denote this initial conﬁguration R0 = HWSW0,
where HW is the hardware platform, and SW0 is the software platform and initial
DSP software conﬁguration. The system is in conformed state. The hardware plat-
form is unalterable, the software platform can be modiﬁed only by the equipment
manufacturer.
We assume that each SDR terminal is equipped with Trusted Platform Module
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Figure 6.1: Component-based certiﬁcation.
(TPM). The manufacturer performs secure boot before releasing the device. During
this boot process the integrity of the device’s initial is measured and store securely.
Public keys of the manufacturer, regulatory agency (RA), and Certiﬁcate Authority
(CA) are also stored in the secure store of TPM. We discuss secure boot in detail in
Section 7.2.1.
Whenever a reconﬁguration is initiated, the system transitions into a temporary
unconformedstate. The conﬁguration processor downloads a new conﬁguration pro-
ﬁle from a software provider. Several security properties must be satisﬁed here.
(1) The software provider must be authorized by a regulatory agency. Thus the au-
thorization and authenticity of the provider must be checked.
(2) The download communication channel must be secured. This protects the in-
tegrity and conﬁdentiality of the downloaded software. Details about secure down-
load are given in Section 6.2.
(3) Certiﬁcation of the downloaded conﬁguration proﬁle must be checked. Each
conﬁguration proﬁle is certiﬁed to comply RF emissions standards on a speciﬁc set
of hardware, software platform. Platform compatibility, as well as the regulatory
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agency’s approval should be checked.
Other download scenarios exist. The downloaded software could be new DSP com-
ponents. In this case, the security checks are the same. Sometimes the device may
reconﬁgure without requiring any software download. Let’s assume that the device
downloaded a combination of conﬁguration proﬁle and DSP components, denoted
by SWx. The conﬁguration processor will perform automated composition of com-
ponents as described in Chapter 5. If the reconﬁguration is a success, then the
SDR terminal transitions back to conformed state. The radio at time t becomes
Rt = HW (SW0 + SWx)t.
6.1.2 Certiﬁable by Construction
We proposed a component-based certiﬁcation methodology for SDR. The end goal is
to certify an entire SDR device for conformity. One of the main challenges is posed
as a question:
Given certified components and a certified protocol for assembly, can we
deduce that the composite is certifiable?
The Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University is conducting re-
search in predictable assembly from certifiable components (PACC). The goal of the
work is to achieve predictability by construction. Predictable assembly is an approach
for integrating individual software components into a collection of parts where criti-
cal run-time properties (e.g., performance, safety, etc.) of that collection are reliably
predicted. That is, by using predictable assembly it can be known before the actual
components, i.e. software code, are integrated that they will play together with re-
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spect to one or more run-time properties of interest [34]. This can be done if the
properties of individual software components are known a priori to their selection or
acquisition.
A component is certiﬁable if it has properties that can be demonstrated in an objective
way. For example, hard disk drive (HDD) manufacturers often provide data sheets
that attest to various properties of their products before receiving type approval
for the equipment. Same is true for SDR hardware and software. If the assembly of
components is well formed, then it is possible to predict the property of the collection.
An assembly is well formed if the way components interact with their environment and
with each other are made explicit. How well they are formed is checked automatically
thus, assembly behavior is predictable by construction. The accuracy and reliability
of reasoning framework predictions is objectively validated using statistically sound
sampling and measurement.
We use the principles of the PACC team’s work to reason about SDR’s component-
based certiﬁcation. In our context, an assembly is a functional graph expressed in a
conﬁguration proﬁle. We can deﬁne an assembly and well formedness of assembly as
such:
Deﬁnition 6.1.1. An assembly must have at least two components.
Each component except source and sink components must have at least one output
port and at least one input port.
Each input and output port must be connected exactly once.
A component cannot be connected to itself.
An assembly is well formed if and only if all input and output ports are connected.
Deﬁnition 6.1.2. An assembly is predictable if it is well formed with respect to the
assembly constraints imposed by one or more property theories.
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Deﬁnition 6.1.3. If a configuration profile is FCC certified, then it has been tested
for all combinations of hardware and software platforms specified in its template.
Furthermore, the profile has been tested for all specified parameter ranges. It produces
output signals with the specified characteristics.
Lemma 6.1.4. If a configuration profile is certified, then it is well formed and pre-
dictable.
Proof. From Deﬁnition 6.1.3, it has been tested extensibly. Then from 6.1.1, it is well
formed. And ﬁnally from 6.1.2 it is predictable.
Remember that software components stored in a local repository of an SDR terminal
are also certiﬁed. Thus, we can predict that if a conﬁguration proﬁle is certi-
ﬁed, then the resulting assembly is certiﬁable. We do not guarantee that the
assembly will succeed. It is possible that some components are missing in the local
repository. Kurt Walnau [35] states that the accuracy and reliability of assembly pre-
dictions is objectively validated using statistically sound sampling and measurement.
FCC regulations require extensive sampling and measurements.
Deﬁnition 6.1.5. FCC requires that each SDR hardware and software combination
must be tested for certification.
Lemma 6.1.6. If a configuration profile is certified, then the resulting radio config-
uration is certifiable.
Proof. According to Deﬁnition 6.1.3, a certiﬁed proﬁle has been tested by the software
provider for all hardware and software platform speciﬁed in its template. This implies
that it has been deployed and tested on the current SDR terminal’s hardware and
software platform. Then by Deﬁnition 6.1.5, the current SDR terminal is certiﬁable.
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6.2 Secure Software Download
Several techniques exist for downloading software securely on to SDR devices [36, 3]
that use traditional protocols such as SSL/TLS. We adopted and augmented a proto-
col based on trusted computing services [37]. The key requirements for secure down-
load of SDR components and conﬁguration proﬁles are: (1) The software provider
must be authorized by a regulatory agency. Thus the authorization and authenticity
of the provider must be checked. (2) The integrity and conﬁdentiality of the com-
munication channel must be protected. (3) Software must be checked for standards
conformance.
In Section 7.1 we review TPM concepts and services. The Mobile Phone Working
group of Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [38] is developing trusted computing
standards speciﬁcally for mobile devices. Therefore it is reasonable to expect that
future mobile devices will be shopping with TPMs.
6.2.1 Protocol Assumptions
We assume the presence of a TPM and a memory protection scheme such as an isola-
tion kernel. This is necessary to ensure the integrity of the downloaded software while
at rest, and to protect security-critical processes from downloaded software. Within
a protected partition, a trusted conﬁguration processor executes upon a trusted op-
erating system. It is this protected environment into which the SDR software, P, will
be downloaded and executed.
We also assume that the SDR device and software provider each have a private
signing key that is securely stored. In an SDR terminal, this public signing key
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is called Attestation Integrity Key (AIK) and is securely stored by the TPM. The
public key for signature veriﬁcation corresponding to the private key is certiﬁed by
a certiﬁcation authority, CA. The certiﬁcate issued binds the identity of SDR device
or software provider to the public key. The SDR’s certiﬁcate must be obtainable by
the software provider, and vice versa.
6.2.2 Protocol Description
Figure 6.2 illustrates the ﬂow of the protocol. We describe the protocol step by step.
Figure 6.2: Secure download protocol.
1. C −→ S: Request for P
The protocol begins when the conﬁguration processor C makes a request for a
speciﬁc SDR software, P, from a software provider S.
2. S −→ C: RS
The software provider sends a random number RS to the device to prevent
message replay.
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3. C −→ TPM: TPMCreateWrapKey
The conﬁguration processor asks TPM to generate an asymmetric encryption
key pair Cpublic and Cprivate by invoking a TPM command TPMCreateWrapKey.
4. TPM −→ C: TPMKey
In response to the TPMCreateWrapKey command, the TPM returns a TPMKey
data structure. This data structure contains Cpublic and encrypted Cprivate. The
data structure also contains integrity metrics I such that the private key can
only be utilized by the TPM on which it was generated when the TPM host
platform is in the speciﬁed state. Speciﬁcally, the integrity metrics include
Platform Conﬁguration Register (PCR) digests at key creation and the PCR
digests required for key release. The PCR digest at creation reﬂects a trusted
execution environment which consists of a correctly functioning conﬁguration
processor running on a trusted radio platform.
5. C −→ TPM: TPMCertifyKey
The handle associated with the key pair is given to the TPM in a TPMCertifyKey
command. The keys and integrity metrics are certiﬁed by the TPM using its
Attestation Identity Key (AIK) so that the state to which the private key is
bound can be shown to the software provider. 160 bits of externally supplied
data, which in this protocol is a one way hash of RS and IdS, may also be given
as an input parameter to this command. RS is a random nonce sent by the
software provider, and IdS is its identity.
6. TPM −→ C: TPM Certify Info ‖
DTPM(H(Cpublic) ‖ H(RS‖ IdS) ‖ I)
In response to the TPMCertifyKey command, the TPM returns TPM Certify Info
data structure. This data structure describes the key that was created and how
the PCR data is used. In addition, the TPM signs the hash of the Cpublic key
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digest and a concatenation of external data RS and IdS. DTPM is the digital
signature of data computer using TPM’s private signature transformation.
7. C −→ S: RS‖ IdS ‖ TPMKey‖ TPM Certify Info
‖ DTPM(H(Cpublic) ‖ H(RS‖ IdS) ‖ I)
The certiﬁed public key and the corresponding AIK credential are then sent
to the software provider. The service provider S veriﬁes the signature on the
data received, checks RS to ensure the message has not been replayed and IdS
to ensure that the message was destined for S. Assuming that everything is
correct, S then veriﬁes the integrity metrics, I. If I describes a trustworthy
platform, then S generates K1SC used for data encryption, and K2SC used for
data integrity protection.
8. S −→ C: ECpublic(K1SC‖ K2SC) ‖
DS(ECpublic(K1SC ‖ K2SC)) ‖
EK1SC(MACK2SC(DRA(P ‖ A)))
On receipt of the above message, the conﬁguration processor veriﬁes the digital
signature DS(ECpublic(K1SC ‖ K2SC)), and if it is valid, instructs the TPM
to decrypt ECpublic(K1SC‖ K2SC). The conﬁguration processor then decrypts
EK1SC(MACK2SC(DRA(H(P)))) and veriﬁes MACK2SC(DRA(P ‖ A)). DRA(P ‖
A) is the requested software and its conformance approval information digitally
signed by a regulatory agency. Once the MAC and conformance are veriﬁed, the
software can be used on the SDR terminal. The software should be encrypted
while stored on the terminal.
Because software download may cause many problems, it must be subject to intense
scrutiny and protection. Authorization to operate must be derived from an appropri-
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ate Regulatory Agency and be carefully certiﬁed. Rogue software in a terminal is a
major point of vulnerability. In the next section we discuss how downloaded software
can be veriﬁed for conformity.
6.3 Conformance Validation
In order ensure that an SDR device is compliant with RF emissions regulations, we
proposed a component-based certiﬁcation scheme described in Section 6.1. Assuming
that the conﬁguration proﬁle and its component software are certiﬁed for compliance
and assuming that the conﬁguration processor and radio platform are independently
certiﬁed for conformance, we can expect the entire SDR device is compliant with
standards and regulations.
The software and hardware platform do not change, or change only under the manu-
facturer’s control. The changing part is DSP components and conﬁguration proﬁles.
In the previous section we discussed how to provide secure software download. The
integrity and conﬁdentiality of the downloaded software in transit was protected.
However, before activating any downloaded software, we must verify whether the
software is approved by a Regulatory Agency for compliance, and whether the soft-
ware is compatible for a particular radio platform.
Certiﬁcation of compliance for a software is issued by an approved Regulatory Agency.
In the United States, such an agency is FCC. Each software or hardware must be
extensibly tested in a lab for all possible scenarios in order to be certiﬁed. A regulatory
agency’s approval is expressed as a digital signature attached to a software.
Conformance Certiﬁcation Format
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When issuing a conformance certiﬁcation, the regulatory agency digitally signs soft-
ware content and accompanying approval information. Approval information includes
the following parts:
• Software serial number
• Hash of software content
• Approval ID
• Regulatory agency ID
• Validity period
• Compatible hardware platforms
• Compatible software platforms
The digital signature is produced by ﬁrst computing a hash of software content and
approval information. Cryptographic hash function such as MD5 or SHA-1 can be
used. Then the hash value is encrypted with the private key of the regulatory body.
The public key is distributed in a form of a certiﬁcate. The regulatory agency’s public
certiﬁcate is obtainable by SDR terminals.
When downloading a new software, an SDR terminal must also download the approval
information. In the previous section we saw that in the ﬁnal stage of the download
protocol the conﬁguration processor receives EK1SC(MACK2SC(DRA(P ‖ A))). Once
decrypted a symmetric encryption key K1SC and MAC is veriﬁed we are left with
DRA(P ‖ A)- a digitally signed software content and its approval information. Con-
formance veriﬁcation can be conducted by:
(1) verify regulatory agency’s signature by applying it’s public key, (2) verify whether
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the hash value of the software content is valid, (2) verify whether validity period is
up-to-date, (3) verify whether software/hardware platform information is compatible
with the host terminal’s.
6.4 Compatibility Check
The general problem of verifying whether the execution of a piece of radio software
would lead to non-conformant radio emissions is not decidable, as it would solve also
the halting problem [39]. We can apply a set of pragmatic checks with the objective
to detect and prevent reconﬁguration attempts that would fail later.
There many possible check of diﬀerent complexities exist that can be performed as
part of conﬁguration validation. Some examples are:
• Comparison of the identiﬁer of the target execution environment indicated as
part of the software component’s descriptor or a conﬁguration proﬁle.
• Veriﬁcation of a XML-based conﬁguration to be a valid XML document. Op-
tionally to validate whether it fulﬁlls its XML DTD (Document Type Deﬁni-
tion).
• The software can be scanned, to check whether it contains API calls that are
not supported by the target platform. For example in GNU Radio, use reﬂective
capability of Python to query object class interfaces.
• Empirical data (log data) can be examined indicating whether a software mod-
ule has been successfully installed and executed on devices of the same type.
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• The download and execution can be simulated on a device simulator; occurring
exceptions or failure messages indicate incompatibility. Also there is a possibil-
ity to digitally analyze the spectrum of the signal in the terminal. This could
be realized using using powerful functions such Fast Fourier Transforms.
6.5 Evaluation
We performed informal analysis of the secure download protocol with respect to the
security objectives: protecting the conﬁdentiality and integrity of software as it is
transported from the software provider to the host platform.
Conﬁdentiality: Symmetric encryption is deployed to protect the conﬁdentiality of
the software P. The symmetric key is securely transported to the SDR terminal under
a public encryption key of an asymmetric key pair. This key pair is inextricably linked
to the requesting trusted SDR terminal where the private decryption key is securely
stored. Assuming that the keys are securely managed by the software provider,
an attacker cannot intercept and gain read access to the software unless there is a
hardware-based attack on the mobile host. This would require the extraction of the
private decryption key from the TPM.
Integrity: A message authentication code is deployed to protect the integrity of
software P in transit. The MAC key is protected by the same technique used to
protect the symmetric encryption key, described above. Thus, assuming secure MAC
algorithms are used, integrity protection depends on the security of the tamper proof
TPM.
Entity authentication: The software provider can verify the identity of the TPM and
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the state of the protected execution environment which utilises TPM security ser-
vices, via the platform attestation mechanism. That is, the signature of the TPM on
RS, IdS and on the integrity metrics representing the protected execution environ-
ment identiﬁes the platforms state and allows the software provider to authenticate
the trusted platform. the public key of the terminal, Cpublic, serves as the nonce
in the response message sent by the radio terminal by virtue of the fact that the
asymmetric key pair is generated for each protocol run. It may be argued that the
protocol outlined above also provides entity authentication with respect to the soft-
ware provider. Since a unique Cpublic is generated for each protocol run, Cpublic acts as
not only a random nonce but also represents the identity of the destination platform.
The signature of the software provider on the unique public key, Cpublic, provides
entity authentication.
Origin authentication: Since S signs K1SC and K2SC, C is able to verify that these
keys have been sent from S. Also, since K2SC is used to compute the MAC, C can
thus verify that the P has been sent from the same source. An attacker attempting




We stated in the security requirements for SDR conﬁguration that the device shall
provide trusted conﬁguration information to its communications service providers on
request. The main reasons a service provider may request this information is ﬁrst,
to ascertain that the terminal conforms with the emissions regulations of the region,
and second, to check whether the terminal’s operating mode is appropriate to receive
the service.
Remote attestation is a technique for ascertaining the operating state of a radio
platform to a remotely located party in a secure manner. The platform software that
manages and controls the device conﬁguration should be trusted, and be able to prove
its trustworthiness to the remote party. Only in this condition, the remote party can
conclude that the conﬁguration information provided by the device is a true reﬂection
of its current state.
Trusted platform software is also needed for validating device’s conformance with
regulations, the technique described in the previous chapter. Composable certiﬁcation
is possible only if the conﬁguration processor and the execution environment can be
trusted. We use Trusted Computing concept to ensure the integrity of radio platform.
In this Chapter ﬁrst we brieﬂy review trusted computing concepts in Section 7.1.
Then in Section 7.2 we describe what speciﬁc TPM functionalities we use to provide
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a trusted SDR platform. In Section 7.3 we present remote attestation service for
SDR.
7.1 Trusted Computing
In this section we give a brief overview of trusted computing concepts and services.
In the context of trusted computing, a platform is trusted if it behaves in an expected
manner for an intended purpose [38]. This does not necessarily imply, however, that
a trusted platform is secure. The platform can be, for example, infected with a virus,
but this eﬀect should be detectable.
Trusted computing, in its original speciﬁcation, does not provide a secure platform
that prevents malicious or accidental modiﬁcation or addition of downloaded software,
and prevents malicious or buggy software being downloaded to and executed on a
device. However, trusted computing functionality can be used to isolate security-
critical software in a secure execution environment so that it cannot be observed
or modiﬁed when executing in parallel with insecure execution environment. We
elaborate on securing the execution environment in Section 8.3.
Nor does TPM provide secure boot mechanism in TCG’s main speciﬁcations. How-
ever, the Mobile Phone Working group [38] is developing trusted computing standards
speciﬁcally for mobile devices, and have speciﬁed several primitives for Mobile Trusted
Module (MTM). We use MTM primitives to devise a secure boot sequence in Section
7.2.1.
In order to implement a platform of this nature, a trusted component, which is usually
in the form of built-in hardware, is integrated into a computing platform. This
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trusted component is then used to create a foundation of trust for software processes
running on the platform. Trusted computing is built upon four fundamental concepts:
integrity measurement, authenticated boot, platform attestation, and sealing. The
trusted component which provides these services is comprised of three so-called roots
of trust the Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM), the Root of Trust for Storage
(RTS), and the Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR). A root of trust is deﬁned as a
component that must be unconditionally trusted for the platform to be trusted.
In the trusted platform speciﬁed by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), the
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) acts as the RTS as well as the RTR whereas the
Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM) is most often part of the BIOS. A TPM
is generally implemented as a chip which must be uniquely bound to a platform. This
hardware component provides four major classes of functions: 1) Cryptographic func-
tions, 2) Secure storage and reporting of hash values representing a speciﬁc platform
conﬁguration, 3) Protected key and data storage, and 4) Initialization and manage-
ment functions.
7.1.1 Trusted Computing Services
Integrity Measurement
An integrity measurement is deﬁned in [40] as the cryptographic digest or hash of a
platform component. For example, an integrity measurement of a program can be
calculated by computing the cryptographic digest or hash of its instruction sequence,
its initial state (i.e. the executable ﬁle) and its input.
Authenticated Boot
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An authenticated boot process represents the process by which a platforms conﬁgu-
ration or state is reliably measured, and the resulting measurement is reliably stored.
During this process, the integrity of a pre-deﬁned set of platform components is mea-
sured, in a particular order. These measurements are condensed to form a set of
integrity metrics which can then be stored in a tamper-resistant log. Condensing
enables an unbounded number of platform component measurements to be stored.
If each measurement was stored separately it would be diﬃcult to decide on an up-
per bound on the size of memory required to store them. A record of the platform
components which have been measured is also stored on the platform.
Attestation
Attestation is the process by which a platform can reliably report evidence of its
identity and its current state (i.e. the integrity metrics which have been stored to
the tamper resistant log, and the record of the platform components which have been
measured).
Sealing
Sealing represents the process of associating data with a set of integrity metrics
representing a particular platform conﬁguration, and encrypting it. The data can only
be decrypted and released when the state of platform is the same as that indicated
by the integrity metrics sealed with the data.
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7.2 Trusted SDR Platform
In this section we present how trusted computing functionality is used to provide a
trusted software platform for SDR. Trusted platform is the basis for providing other
security services for SDR. In Section 6.2 we describe a software download protocol
that leverages trusted computing functionality. In the next section we discuss a
remote attestation methodology which also uses trusted computing services.
The initial conﬁguration of an SDR terminal, i.e. hardware and software combina-
tion, should be certiﬁed by the original equipment manufacturer. The integrity of
platform software must be provided at all times. A secure boot process can be used
to ensure that a set of security-critical platform components boot into the required
state. Secure boot is not deﬁned in the Trusted Computing Group’s TPM main
speciﬁcations. However, the Mobile Phone Working group of TCG [38] is developing
trusted computing standards speciﬁcally for mobile devices. So far they have speci-
ﬁed several primitives for Mobile Trusted Module (MTM). We use MTM primitives
to devise a secure boot sequence.
7.2.1 Secure Boot
In principle, during secure boot process the integrity of a pre-deﬁned set of system
components is measured, and these measurements are then compared against a set of
expected measurements which must be securely stored and accessed by the platform
during the boot process. If, at any stage during the boot process, the removal or
modiﬁcation of a platform component is detected, the boot process is aborted. Now
we outline how to implement a secure boot mechanism using the primitives deﬁned in
the Mobile Trusted Module speciﬁcations [41]. First we introduce some terminology
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related to Mobile Trusted Module.
PCR - Platform Configuration Registers are used by the Root of Trust for Storage to store the platform’s integrity
metrics.
RTV - Root of Trust for verification.
RIM - Reference Integrity Metrics.
Let state = [(i, v1), (j, v2),...] denote a set of PCRs such that PCR with index i holds the value v1 and PCR
with index j holds the value v2 and so on.
Denote by SHA1(x) the SHA1 hash over the byte-string x, e.g. SHA1(imgOS) is the SHA1 hash of the operating
system imgOS.
TPM Extend command modifies the current PCR digest relative to the input 20-byte digest.
An event can be for example the loading of a software image and that event can be represented by a SHA1 hash
of that image.
Denote by TPM Extend(state, index, x) the result of extending state (a set of PCRs as described above) with the
event x into PCR index.
A RIM Certificate (RIM Cert) is an authenticated and integrity protected structure containing a RIM and some
auxiliary information.
Let RIM CertK(state, index, event) denote a TPM RIM CERTIFICATE instance signed by key K authorizing
an extend of event into PCR index when the PCRs already contain the values represented by state.
TPM VerifyRIMCertAndExtend command is used to verify and to extend the RIM given in the RIM certificate
in to a PCR given in the RIM certificate.
Let us assume the boot sequence consists of three software executables that must be
loaded and executed in a deﬁned order: imgOS and imgSDR. For an SDR terminal,
the operating system image (imgOS) includes critical operating services such as a
conﬁguration processor. imgSDR represents an initial set of DSP software deployed
on the terminal. Denote these can be provided by independent developers who do
NOT have access to each others images. As an additional requirement is that an
update to imgOS must not require any additional actions by the supplier of imgSDR.
The system has at least the following states:
• state 0 = [(0, 0), (1, 0), ....]
• state 1 = TPM Extend(state 0, 0, SHA1(RTV done))
• state 2 = TPM Extend(state 1, 1, SHA1(imgOS))
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• state 3 = TPM Extend(state 2, 0, SHA1(imgOS loaded))
• state 4 = TPM Extend(state 3, 2, SHA1(imgSDR))
• state 5 = TPM Extend(state 4, 0, SHA1(imgSDR ready))
The state state0 represents the initialization of all PCRs to zero. For each of the
states i > 0, we have a corresponding RIM Cert i = RIM CertRoot(state i, ...)
that authorizes the extend into state i from the preceding state. It is also assumed
that PCRs 0, 1, 2, and 3 are veriﬁed PCRs, i.e. they can only be extended using
TPM VerifyRIMCertAndExtend. Here is the sequence how the boot would proceed
through the above-mentioned states.
1. The trusted module starts up by having TPM Init and TPM Startup being
called.
2. All PCRs are initialized with the value 00..00.
3. The RTV records into PCR 0 a SHA1 hash of the string (“RTV done“) using
TPM VerifyRIMCertAndExtend command and RIM Cert 1.
4. Next the RTV measures imgOS and looks up a RIM Cert for it. It should ﬁnd
RIM Cert 2 for it.
5. The RTV calls TPM VerifyRIMCertAndExtend for RIM Cert 2.
6. Control is then passed to imgOS.
7. imgOS extends into PCR 0 a SHA1 hash of the string (imgOS loaded) using
RIM Cert 3.
8. imgOS then measures imgSDR and looks up RIM Cert 4.
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9. imgOS calls TPM VerifyRIMCertAndExtend for RIM Cert 4.
10. Control is then passed to imgSDR.
11. SDR extends ﬁnally a SHA1 hash of the string (“SDR ready“) into PCR 0.
This boot sequence for a trusted SDR platform provides the following advantages:
• The secure boot conﬁguration is protected against tampering.
• Any component (imgOS or imgSDR) of the secure boot chain can be updated,
without updating the RIM certiﬁcates of the following components. This is due
to the ability of using PCR 0 as a pre-requisite in the
TPM VerifyRIMCertAndExtend calls.
• Multiple execution paths of the secure boot are possible.
• RIM certiﬁcates for imgOS and imgSDR can be produced independently of each
other, as long as the platform integrator has ﬁxed and published the strings
being extended into PCR 0.
• Boot conﬁguration can be managed remotely, by adding new RIM certiﬁcates.
This is useful for manufacturers in updating the ﬁrmware.
7.3 SDR Remote Attestation
Remote attestation is a technique for ascertaining the operating state of a radio
platform to a remotely located party, e.g. service provider, in a secure manner. The
main reasons a service provider may request this information is ﬁrst, to ascertain that
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the terminal conforms with the emissions regulations of the region, and second, to
check whether the terminal’s operating mode is appropriate to receive the service.
In general, trusted computing uses two concepts to implement remote attestation
functionality: Platform Conﬁguration Registers (PCR) and Attestation Identities
(AI). An Attestation Identity is embodied in a credential, and usually certiﬁed by a
trusted third party to attest that the owning mobile terminal contains a live, unaltered
MTM (Mobile Trusted Module). Producing the AI credential together with PCR
values and measurement logs and signed by the AI private key to an external veriﬁer,
constitutes the attestation process proper.
Due to chained secure boot process, remote attestation is going to be much sim-
pler and straightforward for an SDR terminal. The AIK (Attestation Identity Key)
credentials are associated either implicitly or explicitly with an Root Veriﬁcation
Authority Identiﬁer (RVAI). This RVAI is the root veriﬁcation key loaded using
TPM LoadVeriﬁcationKey that is used to authorize all TPM RIM Certiﬁcate in-
stances accepted by TPM VerifyRIMCertAndExtend extending PCR 0.
If a remote veriﬁer is provided with the public part of the RVAI key then the remote
veriﬁer can merely check the AIK signature, the AIK credentials, whether it trusts
the key RVAI and the contents of PCR 0. The reason why PCR 0 is the only PCR
necessary to check is that all extends to PCR 0 have been authorized by the RVAI
and the events recorded into PCR 0 translate the events (e.g. extensions of the
SHA1(imgOS) in the other PCRs into well-known bit-strings, e.g. SHA1(“imgOS
loaded“). The remote veriﬁer would NOT need to be aware of all the multitudes of
conﬁgurations that are legitimate, it can instead trust a list of veriﬁcation keys that
are used to authorize TPM VerifyRIMCertAndExtend operations.
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During remote attestation of SDR device, the challenger (e.g. service provider) sends
a nonce. The SDR platform signs the nonce in conjunction with integrity metrics
reﬂecting the current state of the platform, using one of its private AIKs. This signed
bundle is returned to the challenger with the record of the platform components which
are reﬂected in the integrity metrics, together with the appropriate AIK credential.
The challenger then uses this information to determine whether it is: (1) Safe to trust
the platform from which the statement has originated; (2) Safe to trust the software
environment running on the platform. The integrity metrics include the digest of the
current conﬁguration, as well as the digest of encrypted source of the conﬁguration
proﬁle.
7.4 Evaluation
We experimented with an open source TPM emulator [42], which runs as Unix daemon
process that can be controlled using Unix domain socket. GNU Radio platform
provides socket interfaces, which were used to connect to the emulator. The TPM
emulator has its own small cryptographic library that is based on GNU Multiple
Precision Arithmetic library. It provides most of the basic TPM functionalities for





In this chapter we describe the design and implementation issues of the secure con-
ﬁguration framework. First we deﬁne functional requirements for the conﬁguration
framework in Section 8.1, and then present the overall design architecture of the
framework in Section 8.2. Then in Section 8.3 we discuss our experiment in devel-
oping a mechanism for secure execution environment for GNU Radio. And ﬁnally in
Section 8.4 we describe the software and hardware platform we used for building the
system.
8.1 Functional Requirements
Our conﬁguration framework will ensure secure and dynamic conﬁguration of SDR
terminals. It is responsible for the coordination of the conﬁguration processes. Func-
tional requirements of the SDR conﬁguration framework are as follows:
• It shall support various protocols and protocol features, capable of dynamic
insertion, replacement and conﬁguration of protocol components from diﬀerent
vendors.
• It shall control and coordinate the reconﬁguration of various equipment com-
ponents.
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• It shall support ﬂexible conﬁguration policy mechanism whereby the rules change
depending on the preferences of the network operator, service provider, or end
user.
• It shall implement local repository for conﬁguration data and reconﬁgurable
software modules.
• Each reconﬁgurable software module shall be accompanied by a descriptor tag
describing its functionality and interfaces.
• Conﬁguration setup shall be expressed in robust manner and be able to interface
with descriptor tags of reconﬁgurable software modules.
In Chapter 4 we presented our security threat model and security requirements for
the conﬁguration framework. These functional and security requirements are satisﬁed
through suitable mechanisms in the conﬁguration framework.
8.2 Architecture
Figure 8.1 illustrates the system architecture highlighting its functional units, main
resources, and inter-component interactions. The conﬁguration framework consists
of the following modules:
• Execution Environment- A platform for executing all equipment functions in-
cluding conﬁguration management and control. The challenge for SDRs is to
ensure that users and applications cannot access nor interfere with the ﬂow of
information at a higher security classiﬁcation such as conﬁguration. To support
multiple levels of security on a single processor, a secure partitioning method
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Figure 8.1: Architecture of the conﬁguration framework.
is needed. We propose a secure Memory Management Unit using hardware-
enforced memory protection to ensure data isolation in diﬀerent partitions.
• Security Module- This module ensures that all the security requirements spec-
iﬁed for the conﬁguration process are satisﬁed. It provides the basic security
functions to all other conﬁguration modules. For example, it provides authenti-
cation function to the Memory Management Unit when a DSP module attempts
to access the shared memory buﬀer of the ﬂow graph. So far, we have spec-
iﬁed the security properties of the conﬁguration framework in informal way,
using descriptive threat model and requirements. For future work, we would
like to use formal security models to demonstrate the feasibility of our security
approaches and to claim that the security of the system is provable.
• Configuration Management Module (CMM)- A functional entity responsible for
the management of all conﬁguration tasks. It initiates, coordinates, and per-
forms conﬁguration functions, and manages the communication between all
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conﬁguration related components. It supports such tasks as mode selection,
download of conﬁguration policies and software modules, and approval of new
radio conﬁgurations.
• Configuration Control Module (CCM)- A supporting entity for CMM, controls
and supervises reconﬁguration execution. The selected and veriﬁed conﬁgura-
tion policy is handed over to the CCM for construction of a ﬂow graph composed
of DSP modules speciﬁed in the policy. The ﬂow graph is then executed by
the runtime environment activating the requested radio operating mode. This
module also ensures that the new conﬁguration is in compliance with regulatory
requirements before executing the conﬁguration.
• Policy Management Module (PMM)- Provisions a conﬁguration policy for a new
conﬁguration approved by the CMM. Parses and veriﬁes downloaded conﬁgura-
tion policies, manages the update and versioning of the local policy repository.
We propose to use XML interface to describe conﬁguration policies, which in
turn require XML descriptors for reconﬁgurable software modules such as DSP
modules.
• Configuration Attestation Module (CAM)- Software attestations will enable a
SDR device to prove to an external party that it is conﬁgured properly. This
module provides trusted conﬁguration information to the service provider upon
request.
Other modules within the framework are local repositories of conﬁguration policies
and reconﬁgurable software modules. The repository of software modules containing
DSP modules and link protocols is not strictly a part of the conﬁguration framework.
However, these software modules are the main target of the conﬁguration process as it
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composes these modules into a ﬂow graph according to the appropriate conﬁguration
policy to activate a particular radio operating mode.
8.2.1 Conﬁguration Management Module
To ensure the proper operation of the radio device that not only accommodates the
hardware speciﬁcations, but also adheres to government regulations, the conﬁguration
process must be protected, and only authorized entities can trigger a new conﬁgura-
tion and only authorized modules can provision, verify, and enforce the conﬁguration
policy.
We propose a Conﬁguration Management Module (CMM) responsible for the man-
agement of all conﬁguration tasks. It initiates, coordinates, and performs conﬁgu-
ration functions, and manages the communication between all conﬁguration related
components.
We shall deﬁne the capabilities of CMM as follows:
• It knows the hardware capabilities of the radio system (e.g., RF, IF parameters).
• It monitors requests for a new radio conﬁguration (e.g., FM receiver).
• It ensures that the Policy Management Module provisions a new conﬁguration
policy matching the request.
• Upon receiving a valid and correct conﬁguration policy from PPM, it ensures
that the Conﬁguration Control Module constructs a ﬂow graph with according
to the provided conﬁguration policy.
• It executes the ﬂow graph and activates a new radio operating mode.
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8.2.2 Policy Management Module
With the increasing agility and programmability of radio hardware, both the number
of modes of operation as well as the range of operating environments for the radio
will increase tremendously. As a result, the number of diﬀerent policy sets that apply
to these various modes and environments will grow in a combinatorial fashion. This
will make it impractical to hard-code into the radio discrete policy sets to cover every
case of interest. We need a more scalable way to express and enforce policy. An
expressive policy language is necessary so that regulators can encode policies in one
language and all SDR radios understand the encoded policy.
Reconﬁgurable software modules should have standardized interfaces such as meta-
tags, the methods by which they can be identiﬁed and used in the installation and
instantiation of these software. Speciﬁcally, they would have XML descriptor ﬁles
that describe the functionality, credentials, interfaces, parameters, and dependencies
of the software module.
The Policy Management Module downloads policy ﬁles speciﬁc to the geography,
hardware, and functionality. It veriﬁes that policy ﬁles come from a trusted source/vendor.
Then it parses the policies expressed in machine-readable policy language to translate
them into an executable ﬂow graph. A conﬁguration policy describes which software
modules and in what manner compose a new conﬁguration. Once a ﬂow graph is
constructed, it is instantiated by the Conﬁguration Control Module.
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8.2.3 Conﬁguration Attestation Module
In general, remote attestation provides the capability to know with certainty the
hardware and software conﬁguration of a remote host. This type of information is
important because many host vulnerabilities are tied to speciﬁc host conﬁgurations.
It allows changes to the computer’s conﬁguration to be detected by the user and
others.
In SDR, remote attestation enables a SDR terminal to prove to an external party that
it is running approved conﬁguration software and the conﬁguration itself is valid. This
proof could be used to authorize access to network services. To this end, we propose
a Conﬁguration Attestation Module (CAM) that certiﬁes to network providers that
the SDR device has been conﬁgured properly.
There are two things that CAM must prove: a) the SDR terminal is running a trusted
conﬁguration software; b) the radio conﬁguration is valid and proper. For the ﬁrst
part, Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) speciﬁed by Trusted Computing Group might
be a proper solution. TPMs [43] enable two new security features, attestation and
sealing. Attestation allows a host to verify securely the conﬁguration of a remote host.
Sealing enables storing data in a host such that the information can be retrieved only
when the host is in the same safe conﬁguration.
To prove that the current radio conﬁguration is valid to third parties, CAM itself
could certify its correctness based on the assumption that CAM is trusted. The third
party already would have veriﬁed the trustworthiness of CAM using TPMs and public
keys. SDR standards specify that SDR devices shall contain a physically protected
Trusted Security Module, similar to TPM [23].
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8.3 Secure Execution Environment
Malicious or malfunctioning software presents serious security risks to SDR devices
in which they operate. Memory management can be an extremely eﬀective security
measure to guard against surreptitious attempts to modify installed software or any
attempts to bypass the normal installation mechanisms.
Support for multiple independent levels of security on a single processor can be pro-
vided by an operating system and processor capable of secure partitioning. A secure
partition is eﬀectively a virtual computer that shares a processor but has its own
tasks, dedicated resources and view of memory. To support this feature, the operat-
ing system and hardware must:
• Ensure that data in one partition can never be accessed, compromised or oth-
erwise deduced or detected by a task in a less secure one.
• Ensure that an error or deliberately malicious behavior in one partition cannot
compromise processing in other partitions or the system as a whole.
• Guarantee that each partition has the resources it needs to execute successfully.
This encompasses processor bandwidth, physical resources such as memory and
kernel objects such as semaphores.
• Ensure that a fault caused by a task in one partitionwhether accidental or
deliberatecannot aﬀect another partition.
Memory Protection Techniques
Several types of protection techniques exist to prevent buﬀer overﬂow such as dynamic
runtime check, address protection, and software fault-isolation. These mechanisms
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are implemented as stand-alone system software, kernel extensions, compiler exten-
sions, and loader extensions. Although no mechanism can prevent all unauthorized
attempts to access memory, these mechanisms along with good programming tech-
niques will help to provide the best possible solution for such attacks [44].
Dynamic runtime check primarily relies on the safety code being preloaded before a
software component is executed. This preloaded component can either provide safer
versions of the standard unsafe functions, or it can ensure that return addresses are
not overwritten. Source code of the software component is not needed. LibSafe is
an example of such solution; it protects a process against the exploitation of buﬀer
overﬂow vulnerabilities in process stacks = [45]. LibSafe intercepts all calls to library
functions that are known to be vulnerable. A substitute version of the corresponding
function implements the original functionality, but in a manner that ensures that any
buﬀer overﬂows are contained within the current stack frame.
Compiler tools allow bounds checking to go into compiled code automatically, without
changing the source code. These compilers generate the code with built-in safeguards
that try to prevent the return address from being overwritten, as most attacks occur
this way. StackGuard detects and defeats smash stacking attacks by protecting the
return address on the stack from being altered [46]. It places a canary word next to
the return address whenever a function is called. If the canary word has been altered
when the function returns, then some attempt has been made on the overﬂow buﬀers.
Software-based fault isolation techniques modify the machine code of a program dur-
ing load time to instrument all critical accesses such as memory read/write, jumps,
calls and returns to point to valid and allowed addresses. Sandboxing is an isolation
technique that inserts a code before every unsafe instruction. This code sets the
upper bits of the target address to the correct segment identiﬁer to ensure that the
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address falls in the logically separate portion of the software component within its
address space [47].
Implementation and Evaluation
We implemented a prototype Memory Management Unit (MMU) which provides pro-
tected access to memory buﬀers used by DSP modules executing in a SDR terminal.
MMU allocates a physical large memory pool which it manages. The DSP modules
composing the current radio conﬁguration operate in virtual memory space allocated
to them by the MMU. Each software module has access only to its own virtual mem-
ory space. Additionally, MMU also allocates and manages access to the shared buﬀers
used in the ﬂow graph pipeline to temporary store the signal stream being processed.
A shared buﬀer can be read/written only by those DSP modules that are registered
as its reader/writer.
Our solution utilizes the encapsulation capability of object-oriented programming
and a LINUX system function for privileged memory access. We deﬁned a new buﬀer
class that allocates and manages buﬀers in more secure manner than the current
GNU software radio platform. A buﬀer allocated for signal processing can be read or
written only by authorized signal processing modules that are registered as readers or
writers of the buﬀer. When a read/write operation is attempted, the buﬀer veriﬁes
the identity of the requester. For write operation, the buﬀer also checks whether
there is enough space to write the requested number of elements into the buﬀer, thus
preventing buﬀer overﬂow.
We use the LINUX system function mprotect to control accesses to a region of mem-
ory containing shared buﬀers and to prevent malicious or faulty code from obtaining
a random pointer within the processs address space and overwriting it. mprotect
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assigns desired access permissions for the memory pages containing the given mem-
ory region. If a disallowed access is attempted, the program receives a segmentation
violation. A shared buﬀer stays read-only most of the time. It is unlocked for writ-
ing only during a write operation by a module that’s authorized to write to that
particular buﬀer.
We have performed a performance evaluation of our memory protection mechanism.
The evaluation setup is as follows:
• Since the main overhead due to new security features lies in memory accesses,
we want to observe the eﬀects of increasing number of shared signal processing
buﬀers and size of input data on the running time of the system. We tested the
radio system using a self-loop through TCIP/IP socket, without the RF front-
end hardware USRP, because delays due to radio transmission and digital-to-
analog conversion are orthogonal to our study.
• We used input ﬁles containing voice data of varying size. These data were
recorded using GNU Radio.
• We used signal processing blocks that applied simple mathematical functions
on input data such as multiplication by a vector. As the number of signal pro-
cessing blocks increased, the number of shared buﬀers increased proportionally.
Figure 8.2 illustrates running time of the radio system in two diﬀerent cases: a)
unmodiﬁed base case; b) security mechanism in place. For each of these cases we run
the radio system with three diﬀerent ﬂow graph constructions: 1 buﬀer, 3 buﬀers, 5
buﬀers. There are six test suites. We execute each test suit with 10 diﬀerent input
ﬁles of varying sizes, ranging from 100 Kb to 128 Mb. The dotted lines indicate the
performance of the base case; the solid lines indicate the performance of the radio
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Figure 8.2: Runtime overhead of the memory protection mechanism.
system with shared buﬀer protection. The results of our evaluation show that our
memory protection mechanism does not add signiﬁcant overhead (less than 5%) to
the running time of the radio system; the overhead is negligible.
8.4 Implementation Platform
Several software environments have been developed for implementing PHY layers for
SDR platforms. Besides a number of commercial platforms, two well known open
source platforms are GNU Radio and the Virginia Tech OSSIE platform.
We used GNU Radio as our software platform for implementing and evaluating the
Secure Conﬁguration Framework.
GNU Radio platform is reasonably hardware-independent. For a computation hard-
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ware, a 1 or 2 GHz commodity machine with at least 256 MB of RAM should suﬃce.
We also need some way to connect the analog world to the computer. Low-cost op-
tions such as built-in sound cards would limit us to processing relatively narrow band
signals. Oﬀ-the-shelf, high-speed PCI analog-to-digital boards are available in the
20M sample/sec range, but they are quite expensive. Finding none of these alterna-
tives completely satisfactory, we chose the Universal Software Radio Peripheral for
our hardware experimentation. With USRP board, we were able to operate a com-
plete software deﬁned radio- analog antenna on one end and GNU Radio software on
the other end, bridged by USRP.
Next, we describe the software and hardware platforms used in our implementation
in detail.
8.4.1 GNU Radio Software
GNU Radio is an open source toolkit for building software radios [48]. It is designed
to run on desktop computers and, combined with minimal hardware, allows the con-
struction of simple software radios. The project was started in early 2000 by Eric
Blossom and has evolved into a mature software infrastructure that is used by a large
community of developers.
The GNU Radio signal processing library provides signal processing blocks for modu-
lation, demodulation, ﬁltering, and I/O operations such as ﬁle access. In addition, it
also provides blocks for communicating with the USRP. New blocks can be added as
needed. A radio is built by connecting these blocks to form a ﬂowgraph. This ﬂow-
graph is a directed acyclic graph in which the vertices are the GNU Radio blocks and
the edges correspond to data streams. Figure 8.3 shows how a FIR Filter, Quadra-
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ture Demodulator and Audio Sink are connected in a ﬂowgraph to form a simple FM
receiver. Programming in the GNU Radio platform uses a combination of C++ and
Python: the processing blocks are implemented in C++ while the ﬂowgraph and the
applications that sit on top are developed in Python. We now brieﬂy elaborate on
key properties of both processing blocks and ﬂowgraphs.
Figure 8.3: GNU Radio ﬂowgraph for a simple FM Receiver.
Processing blocks - Generally blocks operate on continuous streams of data. Most
blocks have a set of input and output streams: they consume data from their input
streams to generate data for their output streams. Special blocks, called sources and
sinks, only produce or consume data, respectively. Examples of sources are blocks
that read from USRP RX ports, sockets and ﬁle descriptors. Similarly, sinks include
blocks that write to USRP TX ports, sockets and ﬁle descriptors. Each block has an
input and output signature (IO signatures) that deﬁnes the minimum and maximum
number of input and output streams it can have, as well as the size of the data type
on the input and output streams.
Each block deﬁnes a work function that operates on its input to produce output
streams. In order to help the scheduler decide when to call the work function, blocks
also provide forecast functions that tell the runtime system the number of input items
it requires to produce a number of output items and how many output items it can
produce given a number of input items. At runtime, blocks tell the system how many
input (output) items they consumed (produced). Blocks may consume data on each
input stream at a diﬀerent rate, but all output streams must produce data at the
same rate.
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Data buﬀers The input and output streams of a block have buﬀers associated with
them. Each input stream has a read buﬀer, from which the block reads data for
processing. Similarly, after processing, blocks write data to the appropriate write
buﬀers of its output streams. The data buﬀers are used to implement the edges in
the ﬂowgraph: the input buﬀers for a block are the output buﬀers of the upstream
block in the ﬂowgraph. GNU Radio buﬀers are single writer, multiple reader FIFOs.
Flowgraph mechanisms Users build a radio by deﬁning a ﬂowgraph using the
connect function. The connect function speciﬁes how the output stream(s) of a pro-
cessing block connects to the input stream of one or more downstream blocks. The
ﬂowgraph mechanism then automatically builds the ﬂowgraph; the details of this pro-
cess are hidden from the user. An key function during ﬂow graph construction is the
allocation of data buﬀers to connect neighboring blocks. The buﬀer allocation algo-
rithm considers the input and output block sizes used by blocks and the relative rate
at which blocks consume and produce items on their input and output streams. Once
buﬀers have been allocated, they are connected with the input and output streams
of the appropriate blocks.
Scheduler - The GNU Radio scheduler executes the graph that was built by the ﬂow-
graph mechanism. It is implemented as a single thread that loops over all the blocks
in the graph, executing each block sequentially until all the data has been consumed.
During the execution, the scheduler queries each block for its input requirements
and it uses the above mentioned forecast functions to determine how much data the
block can consume from its available input. If suﬃcient data is available in the input
buﬀers, the schedule calls the blocks work function. If a block does not have suﬃcient
input, the scheduler simply moves on to the next block in the graph. Skipped blocks
will be executed later, when more input data is available. The scheduler is designed
to operate on continuous data streams.
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8.4.2 USRP Hardware
The Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) board is a low-cost, high speed
hardware component which is very suitable for implementing some real time software
radio applications. It is developed by a team led by Matt Ettus for the GNU Ra-
dio users [49]. This is an integrated board which incorporates AD/DA converters,
some forms of RF front end, and an FPGA which helps to do some high-speed general
purpose operations such as digital up and down conversion, decimation and interpola-
tion. Since this board is mainly for developing software radios, the waveform-speciﬁc
processing, like modulation and demodulation are usually done in the host processing
unit. Typically, a USRP board consists of one mother board and up to four daughter
boards and it requires a PC or MAC with USB2 interface. Figure 8.4 shows the
picture of a USRP board equipped with two Receive (RX) and two Transmit (TX)
daughter boards.
The block diagram of a USRP board is shown in Figure 8.5. It has 4 high-speed
analog to digital converters (ADCs), each at 12 bits per sample, 64 million samples
per second. There are also 4 high-speed digital to analog converters (DACs), each
at 14 bits per sample, 128 million samples per second. These 4 input and 4 output
channels are connected to an Altera Cyclone EP1C12 FPGA. Moreover, this FPGA
connects to a USB2 interface chip, the Cypress FX2, and on to the computer. The
USRP connects to the computer via a high speed USB2 interface, and it will also
work with USB1.1 after installing some software patches.
AD/DA Converters
Two mixed-signal front end processors (AD9862) from Analog Devices has been used
in the USRP board to perform all the analog to digital and digital to analog con-
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Figure 8.4: USRP mother board with two RX and two TX daughter boards.
versions. There are 4 high-speed 12-bit AD converters. The sampling rate is 64M
samples per second. In principle, it could digitize a band as wide as 32MHz. The
AD converters can bandpass-sample signals of up to about 150MHz, though. If we
sample a signal with the IF larger than 32MHz, we introduce aliasing and actually the
band of the signal of interest is mapped to some places between -32MHz and 32MHz.
Sometimes this can be useful, for example, we could listen to the FM stations without
any RF front end. The higher the frequency of the sampled signal, the more the SNR
will be degraded by jitter. 100MHz is the recommended upper limit.
The full range on the ADCs is 2V peak to peak, and the input is 200 ohms diﬀerential.
This is 40mW, or 16dBm. There is a programmable gain ampliﬁer (PGA) before the
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Figure 8.5: Block diagram of a USRP board.
ADCs to amplify the input signal to utilize the entire input range of the ADCs, in
case the signal is weak. The PGA is up to 20dB. Note that we can use other sampling
rates if desired. The available rates are all submultiples of 128MHz, such as 64 MS/s,
42.66 MS/s, 32 MS/s, 25.6 MS/s and 21.33 MS/s.
The Daughter Boards
On the mother board there are four slots for inserting up to 2 RX daughter boards
and 2 TX daughter boards. The daughter boards are used to hold the RF receiver
interface or tuner and the RF transmitter. There are slots for 2 TX daughter boards,
labeled TXA and TXB, and 2 corresponding RX daughter boards, RXA and RXB.
Each daughter board slot has access to 2 of the 4 high-speed AD / DA converters
(DAC outputs for TX, ADC inputs for RX). This allows each daughter board which
uses real (not I Q) sampling to have 2 independent RF sections, and 2 antennas (4
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total for the system). If complex I Q sampling is used, each board can support a single
RF section, for a total of 2 for the whole system. There are two SMA connectors on
each daughter board. We normally use them to connect the input or output signals.
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
FPGA plays an important role in software radio’s operation. All the ADCs and DACs
are connected to the FPGA. Some of the high bandwidth math has been done into
the FPGA to reduce the data rates so that the data can be transported through
the USB 2.0 bus. The FPGA connects to a USB2 interface chip, the Cypress FX2.
FPGA circuitry and USB Microcontroller is programmable over the USB 2.0 bus. Our
standard FPGA conﬁguration includes digital down converters (DDC) implemented
with cascaded integrator-comb (CIC) ﬁlters. The FPGA implements 4 digital down
converters (DDC). This allows 1, 2 or 4 separate RX channels. At the RX path,
we have 4 ADCs, and 4 DDCs. Each DDC has two inputs real and complex. Each
of the 4 ADCs can be routed to either of real or the complex input of any of the 4
DDCs. This allows for having multiple channels selected out of the same ADC sample
stream.
The digital up converters (DUCs) on the transmit side are actually contained in the
AD9862 CODEC chips, not in the FPGA. The only transmit signal processing blocks
in the FPGA are the interpolators. The interpolator outputs can be routed to any
of the 4 CODEC inputs. The multiple RX channels (1,2, or 4) must all be the same
data rate (i.e. same decimation ratio). The same applies to the 1,2, or TX channels,
which each must be at the same data rate (which may be diﬀerent from the RX rate).
Figure 8.6 shows the block diagram of the USRP’s receive path. The MUX is like a
router or a circuit switcher. It determines which ADC (or constant zero) is connected
to each DDC input. There are 4 DDCs. Each has two inputs.
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Figure 8.6: Block diagram of the USRP receive path.
Digital Down Converter (DDC)
DDC down converts the signal from the IF band to the base band. Second, it deci-
mates the signal so that the data rate can be adapted by the USB 2.0 and is reasonable
for the computers’ computing capability. The complex input signal (IF) is multiplied
by the constant frequency (usually also IF) exponential signal. The resulting signal
is also complex and centered at 0. Then we decimate the signal with a factor N.
The decimator can be treated as a low pass ﬁlter followed by a down sampler. The
decimation rate must be in 1 to 256. Finally, the I and Q complex signal enters the
computer via the USB for further processing. TX path works reversely. We need to
send a baseband I and Q complex signal to the USRP board. The digital up converter





In this chapter, I present a summary of existing research and show how my thesis
complements related topics. In Section 9.1, I summarize the ongoing major initiatives
that investigate SDR related issues. In Section 9.2, I survey previously published
works in SDR security and discuss how they relate to this thesis. In Section 9.3,
I summarize research works on SDR conﬁguration and compare them to our work.
In Section 9.4, I review research works on component composition as it applies to
systems software. Finally, in Section 9.5, I overview formal security models and
discuss whether they are applicable to our work.
9.1 SDR Initiatives
There are several ongoing eﬀorts that investigate SDR related issues. The notable
key projects include: the XG program undertaken by DARPA, the JTRS program
initiated by DoD, the E2R project of the European FP6 program, the NCASSR SDR
project led by NCSA, and the OSSIE project at Virginia Tech.
The DARPA neXt Generation (XG) communications program [50] develops a new
generation of spectrum access technology. In order to address the ”apparent” scarcity
of spectrum and deployment diﬃculty of services, XG is pursuing an approach wherein
static allotment of spectrum is complemented by the opportunistic use of unused
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spectrum on an instant-by-instant basis. They stress that the true potential of this
new approach can be exploited only if in addition to spectrum agility, they provide
policy agility where policies are not embedded in the radio, but can be loaded ”on-
the-ﬂy”. XG speciﬁes a policy language framework to express and enforce policies
[51]. They chose the WWW Consortium’s Web Ontology Language (OWL) as a base
language for this framework. OWL is a machine-understandable, semantic markup
language, and it’s an extension of XML and RDF. XG focuses on the generation and
translation of spectrum allocation policies, whereas our proposal pertains to radio
conﬁguration policy.
The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Program [52] is the U.S DoD initiative.
JTRS developed a Software Communications Architecture (SCA) [53] that provides
an open architecture framework enabling programmable radios to load waveforms,
run applications and be networked into an integrated system. The security require-
ments for this architecture are speciﬁed at all layers of radio system: hardware,
operating system and applications. They provide a deﬁnition of security architecture
and associated requirements for future U.S. DoD radios. SCA has been adopted by
SDR Forum [54], the international standardization body of software radio technol-
ogy. SDRF is facilitating broad international acceptance of the SCA across all SDR
domains around the globe, including civil, commercial and military sectors.
End-to-end reconﬁgurability (E2R) has been identiﬁed as a major research topic
in the European 6th Framework Program (FP6) [55]. The project scope covers the
complete end-to-end system (stretching from the user device all the way up to internet
protocol and services) as well as reconﬁgurability support (functionalities such as
management and control, download support, spectrum, regulatory issues and business
models) along the whole communication path. One of the major working areas in
E2R is mechanisms to increase spectrum and resource eﬃciency through application
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of reconﬁgurability.
The NCASSR SDR Project at NCSA [56] investigates various SDR related issues such
as extending the GNU Software Radio receiver design into a 900MHz narrowband
software-deﬁned radio transceiver. They are also developing a real-time visualization
software that provides a qualitative, high-level block diagram of the operation of
the SDR. Related to SDR security area, the NCASSR team is developing a voice
authentication application that identiﬁes and authorizes SDR users.
OSSIE [57] is an open source Software Deﬁned Radio (SDR) development eﬀort based
at Virginia Tech. OSSIE is primarily intended to enable research and education in
SDR and wireless communications. The OSSIE software package includes an SDR
core framework based on the JTRS Software Communications Architecture (SCA),
tools for rapid development of SDR components and waveforms (applications), and
an evolving library of pre-built components and waveforms. OSSIE is an alternative
SDR platform to GNU Radio. Our implementation platform of choice was GNU
Radio.
9.2 Research in SDR Security
In this section, we discuss previous research related to security of software deﬁned
radio. We have categorized this work into three main groups. The ﬁrst one proposes
a secure SDR device architecture. The second group presents security framework
for download to commercial wireless devices. The third group proposes schemes for
securing the download channel.
Lam, Sakaguchi et al. [58, 59] propose a secure SDR device architecture with the
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following key features: 1) separate hardware and software certiﬁcation; 2) Radio
Security Module whose functionality includes installation, storage, operation, storage,
and termination of software in the terminal; 3) Global Positioning System used to
determine in which geographical location the wireless device is operating for global
roaming support; 4) Automatic Calibration Unit to ensure that the output spectrum
is compliant with regional radio regulations. It is not clear whether this solution is
cost-eﬀective for commercial wireless devices.
Michael et al. [60] propose a framework for establishing secure download for SDR that
includes employment of tamper resistant hardware and four diﬀerent cryptographic
techniques: secret key encryption, public key encryption, cryptographic hashing, and
digital signature. This framework provides solutions for veriﬁcation of the declared
identity of the downloaded software, veriﬁcation of the integrity of the downloaded
data, disabling the ability to run unauthorized software on the SDR device, and
the secrecy of the downloaded data. They assume the existence of tamper-resistant
hardware that provides secure storage for the terminal keys. This work also assumes
that software is created and distributed by the hardware maker. Sugita et al. [61]
propose an electronic commerce scheme that utilizes the ability of SDR to switch
between diﬀerent security algorithms. The following issues are identiﬁed, but without
precise speciﬁcations: a) encryption of download channel, hardware key, and terminal
ID to prevent illegal copying of the downloaded program; b) certiﬁcation against
alteration of the downloaded program. While this work addresses the secure software
download problem, our work focuses on the problem of secure conﬁguration and
execution of downloaded software.
Brawerman et al. [3] propose a lightweight LSSL protocol that uses less bandwidth
than SSL to securely connect a manufacturer’s server and SDR devices for download-
ing radio conﬁguration ﬁles. In addition to securing the download connection, their
107
secure protocol includes mutual authentication, public/private key mechanisms for
data encryption and decryption, and ﬁngerprint calculations to check data integrity.
Uchikawa et al. [36] propose a secure download system that uses the characteristics
of the ﬁeld programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). The wiring of conﬁguration logic
blocks on FPGAs can be arranged in many diﬀerent ways (astronomical number),
enabling high security encipherment to prevent illegal acquisition of software using
replay attack. These works assume that SDR devices download software only from
their manufacturers, and they focus on conﬁdentiality and authentication aspects
of SDR security. We assume that software can be provided by a third-party, and
certiﬁed software could be buggy.
Some of the SDR Forum documents discuss security issues [5, 28, 29]. Among them,
Falk et al. [5] suggest the use of sandboxing as a possible approach to prevent
harm from potentially malicious software. We elaborated on this idea further and
implemented a prototype of secure memory management unit.
9.3 Research in SDR Conﬁguration
Several previous works researched SDR conﬁguration issues [2, 62, 63, 64]. However,
none of these works speciﬁcally address the problem of mapping high-level conﬁgu-
ration policies into executable dataﬂow graphs or propose techniques for validating
candidate conﬁgurations. Generally, these works outline a reconﬁguration architec-
ture without speciﬁc methodologies or security functions.
Moessner et al. [2] propose a distributed Reconﬁguration Management Architecture
(RMA) oﬀering the means to control and manage reconﬁguration of Software Deﬁned
Radios and introduces a mechanism capable to verify the radio standard adherence
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of intended terminal conﬁgurations. A particular focus of this work was on the
description of software for the reconﬁgurable radio part within a SDR terminal, as
tag-ﬁles. Speciﬁcations for security functions are not included in this work.
Srikanteswara et al. [62] present a uniﬁed design architecture of soft radios on a
reconﬁgurable platform called the Layered Radio Architecture. This architecture
makes it possible to incorporate all the features of a SDR while minimizing complexity
issues. Burgess et al. [64] present a framework developed in the SCOUT project that
allows the software modeling of SDR conﬁguration. The framework is aimed at a
heterogeneous hardware platform and takes into account real-time constraints as well
as being power conscious.
Kountouris et al. [63] cover issues related to the device-level support for SDR reconﬁg-
uration. Device level support implies appropriate hardware and software architectures
as well as design approaches accounting for the supported reconﬁguration scenarios
and for the device speciﬁc constraints. A customized, lightweight component-based
approach has been proposed that can be tailored to handle various types of reconﬁg-
uration scenarios necessitating network involvement.
9.4 Component Composition
Component composition has been studied in diﬀerent research areas, such as service
composition [65, 66] and systems software composition [67, 68, 34]. Although we
adapted some principles and techniques developed for service composition, our work
ﬁts in the later category.
X. Gu, K. Nahrstedt et al. [65, 66] introduce an integrated peer-to-peer service
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composition framework that provides high quality and failure resilient service com-
position. From this work we adapted the composition model based on graph mapping.
In our work, we map a conﬁguration proﬁle of a radio device into an executable graph
of software components.
Much of the early research in component-based systems software involves the design
and implementation of microkernels such as Mach [69] and Spring [70]. With an
emphasis on ﬂexible and extensible architectures microkernel research is essentially
complementary to research on reconﬁgurable, component-based radio platforms.
The most popular topic in this area is the use of component kits for building systems
software. Reid et al. [67] developed Knit, a component deﬁnition and linking language
designed for component kits. It provides support for component conﬁguration and
detects errors in component composition. The Scout operating system [71] consist of
a modest number of modules that can be combined to create software for network
appliances and protocols. The Click system [72] also focuses on networking, but
speciﬁcally targets packet routers. These systems do not support non-functional
requirements for composition and do not provide automated conﬁguration, in contrast
to our work.
Ensuring the correctness of software composition at construction time has been ad-
dressed in the literature in a number of diﬀerent ways. In [68] the authors introduce
the notion of micro-components. Micro-components represent programming language
idioms. they have assigned contracts and requirements. When being composed those
contracts and requirements are statically checked using ﬁrst order predicate logic.
However, non-functional requirements and composition rules are not considered.
Walnau [35] aims to achieve predictability by construction. By using predictable
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assembly it can be known before the actual components are integrated that they will
play together with respect to one or more run-time properties of interest. We use
the principles of this work to reason about SDR’s component-based certiﬁcation. We
discuss this in detail in Section 6.1.2.
9.5 Security Models
Models are important in determining the policies a secure system should enforce
[73, 74], and understanding whether the properties of protection systems can be
achieved [75, 76, 77]. In particular, security models are used to test a particular policy
for completeness and consistency, document a policy, design an implementation, and
verify whether an implementation meets its requirements [78].
The Bell-La Padua model [73] describes the allowable paths of information ﬂow in
a secure system. The model is a formal state transition model of computer security
policy that describes a set of access control rules by the use of security labels on
objects, from the most sensitive to the least sensitive, and clearances for subjects:
top secret, secret, conﬁdential, unclassiﬁed. The notion of a secure state is deﬁned,
and it is proven that each state transition preserves security by moving from secure
state to secure state, thereby inductively proving that the system is secure. While the
Bell-La Padua model focused only on conﬁdentiality of information, the Biba model
[74] describes rules for the protection of information integrity and is characterized
by the phrase: ”no write up, no read down”. In this model, users can only create
content at or below their own security level, and they can only view content at or
above their own security level.
The Graham-Denning model [75] is a formal model having generic protection prop-
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erties. The model has eight basic protection rules that outline how to securely cre-
ate/delete an object, create/delete a subject, provide the read/grant access right,
and securely provide the delete/transfer access right. The Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman
model [76] states certain characteristics that can or cannot be decided by an arbi-
trary protection system. This model is based on commands, where each command
involves conditions and primitive operations. The Take-Grant model [77] is a formal
protection model used to establish or disprove the safety of a given computer system
that follows speciﬁc rules. It shows that for speciﬁc systems the question of safety is




This chapter highlights the lessons learned from my study of security and conﬁgura-
tion issues of software deﬁned radio, and summarizes solutions I explored to address
relevant problems.
10.1 Conclusions
The principal deﬁning characteristic of SDR is that the most important operational
parameters can be conﬁgured when it is in use rather than when it is manufactured.
This enables highly ﬂexible handheld devices that can switch from one network tech-
nology to another to suit a particular application or environment. However, recon-
ﬁgurability makes attacks against the SDR terminal and network easier and perhaps
more prevalent. As SDR technology gains widespread usage, it is inevitable that
third party component support, and ﬂexible conﬁguration schemes will emerge.
In this thesis we presented a secure conﬁguration framework that addresses wide vari-
ety of issues related to radio reconﬁgurability. We conducted extensive survey of SDR
security issues, and formulated a list of security requirements for our work. Detect-
ing unauthorized modiﬁcations of SDR conﬁguration software, preventing a hacker
from changing the device conﬁguration, ensuring that radio emissions are limited to
those of regulations, allowing installation of only certiﬁed software, facilitating radio
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to ascertain its conﬁguration information to service providers- these are some of the
security requirements.
Keeping these requirements in mind, we developed an automated conﬁguration method-
ology that decouples waveform design from its implementation. Given a expert
database of blueprints on how to compose a particular type of radio, our system
automatically builds a deployable composition of digital signal processing modules.
Ensuring validity and safety of such composable radios turns out to be a very hard
problem. We narrowed the scope of conﬁgurations proﬁles so that we can make bet-
ter predictions about the properties of the composite part. We require that software
components and conﬁguration proﬁles come pre-certiﬁed. We modeled the notion of
composable certiﬁcation, and were able to make some assertions about the conformity
of the composite radio device.
By requiring more speciﬁc conﬁguration proﬁles, we were able to achieve more eﬃcient
mapping of a conﬁguration proﬁle into a deployable DSP ﬂowgraph. Methodology for
verifying software certiﬁcation and checking compatibility of a conﬁguration for the
host radio are discussed. We presented performance evaluation of the composition
algorithm, and described our experiment of deploying it on GNU Radio software
platform and USRP hardware platform.
We addressed the issue of protecting integrity and conﬁdentiality of downloaded soft-
ware. Instead of using traditional secure communication techniques, we designed a
protocol that utilizes Trusted Platform Module’s (TPM) functionalities. In order to
ensure conformity of an SDR terminal and provide an eﬀective way to for the terminal
to ascertain its current state to a remote party, we make an assumption that all SDR
terminals come equipped with a TPM. We informally analyzed the secure download
protocol for security properties.
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We discussed how trusted computing can be adapted for SDR to provide a trusted
radio platform. We outlined a secure boot sequence that uses integrity primitives
speciﬁed for Mobile Trusted Module. This boot sequence has a property where the
veriﬁer of the platform integrity need not check all attestation certiﬁcates, but just
the initial one.
10.2 Summary of Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is a framework for secure conﬁguration of software
deﬁned radios. The speciﬁc contributions are:
1. Technique for automatically conﬁguration a radio terminal given a conﬁguration
proﬁle.
2. Graph mapping model for composing DSP components.
3. Speciﬁed portable format for conﬁguration proﬁle.
4. Component-based technique for radio certiﬁcation.
5. Protocol for secure download of radio software.
6. Methodology for conformance validation and compatibility check.
7. Application of trusted computing concepts to build a trusted SDR platform.
8. Secure boot sequence for trusted SDR platform.
9. Methodology for remote attestation.
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To summarize, I claim my thesis provides a secure conﬁguration framework to au-
tomatically conﬁgure waveform components of a software radio and ensures validity
and integrity of the radio conﬁguration.
10.3 Future Research
In this section we discuss possible directions for future work to address SDR conﬁg-
uration issues.
One interesting problem to explore in the future is a dynamic conﬁguration scheme
where device conﬁguration dynamically adapts to changing network conditions. The
conﬁguration should correspond to the capabilities, preferences, and dynamic prop-
erties (load, radio link properties) of the currently used network. For example, in
a noisy communication environment, the conﬁguration may choose to use baseband
software modules that perform better signal ﬁltering at the expense of more power
consumption. Or when multiple radio access technologies are available in the region,
the terminal may switch to the one with less power demand. In this scenario, the
terminal will continue using the same service, as the service providers need not be
associated with one single network operator. Note, our work addresses SDR conﬁgu-
ration initiated by some actor, i.e. on-demand scheme, not dynamic.
In our we compose DSP software components based on a conﬁguration proﬁle. The
ﬂip side of this, generating a conﬁguration proﬁle from an existing radio conﬁguration
has some uses. The beneﬁt of developing such a tool is making conﬁgurations of legacy
devices portable. This tool would parse the source code of a deployable conﬁguration
(likely to be in high-level languages such as C++, Python) and generates an XML
template of the conﬁguration proﬁle.
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Another interesting future work would be to explore various ways to reason about
composable properties. Modeling and asserting a composite property of composable
components is very challenging. Given properties of individual components, and the
blueprint of interconnecting them, how to derive characteristics of the composite
part? Composability of security properties is especially of interest to the authors.
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